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REFORMING RETIREMENT SYSTEMS:
WHY THE FRENCH HAVE SUCCEEDED WHEN AMERICANS HAVE
NOT*
Kathryn L. Moore'
I. INTRODUCTION
As life expectancy increases2 and the baby boom generation approaches
retirement age, 3 retirement systems throughout the Western world are facing
financing difficulties. 4 In recent years, many European countries, including France,5
Italy,6 Sweden, 7 Switzerland, 8 and Germany, 9 have amended their retirement systems

* At the time this article went to press, President Bush was displaying commitment to
the reform of Social Security, but it was not clear whether that commiment would be enough
for his reform effort to succeed. If the reform efforts fail, it will not be due to any lack of
political commitment. Rather, the failure will likely arise from the fact that the American
Social Security system faces a long-term, not a short-term, deficit, and the keystone of
President Bush's reform plan, individual accounts, would do nothing to resolve Social
Security's funding difficulties.
1. Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
The author would like to thank Peter Hislop and John Turner for their comments on an earlier
draft of this article, Josh Miller and Tai Tucker for their research assistance, and Jean-Michel
Combes, Michael Healy, and Amy Osborne for their assistance in finding many of the
authorities cited in this article.
2. See BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND DISABILITY TR.
FUNDS, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 82 tbl.V(A)(3) (showing life expectancy for sixty-five year old
American men increased from 11.9 years in 1940 to 16.0 years in 2003 and from 13.4 years in
1940 to 19.0 years in 2003 for sixty-five year old women); CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES
RETRAITES,

RETRAITES:

RENOUVELER

LE CONTRAT

SOCIAL ENTRE

LES GENERATIONS,

ORIENTATIONS, ET DEBATS 24 (2001), available at http://www.cor-retraites.fr/article25.html
(last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (showing life expectancy in France for 60 year old men increasing
from 15.4 years in 1950 to 20.2 years in 2000) [hereinafter CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES
RETRAITES].

3. The eldest of the baby boom generation will reach 62, the earliest eligibility age for
social security retirement benefits, in 2008. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SOCIAL SECURITY:
DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY 20 (1998).

4. See Kathryn L. Moore, The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Lessonsfrom
Recent Reforms of the French Retirement System, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 441, 444 n.7
(2001).
5. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003, J.O., Aug. 22, 2003, p. 14 3 10 (Fr.).
6. See, e.g., PIERRE-ALAN GRECIANO, LES RETRAITES EN FRANCE: QUEL AVENIR 223-32
(2002) (discussing recent reforms to Italian retirement system).
7. See, e.g., John Turner, Individual Pension Accounts: The Innovative Swedish
Reform, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 27 (2004) (discussing the 1999 reform of the Swedish retirement
system).
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to address these funding difficulties. 10 Despite years of debate," however, the
American Social Security system 12 has not been changed in any significant way since
1983.13
In order to understand why the American Social Security system has been so
resistant to change while the retirement systems in other countries have been
amended, this Article analyzes why one country, France, was able to reform its
retirement system significantly in 2003. The Article begins by briefly describing the
French retirement system prior to 2003. It then provides an overview of the most
significant changes wrought by the reform enacted in 2003. It then analyses why,
after years of inaction and failed attempts to reform the French retirement system, the
government succeeded in reforming the retirement system in 2003. Finally, it
considers why the United States, after years of debate, has not enacted any major

8.

See, e.g., GIULIANO BONOLI, THE POLITICS OF PENSION REFORM: INSTITUTIONS AND

POLICY CHANGE IN WESTERN EUROPE 86-117 (2000) (discussing 1999 reform of Swiss
retirement system).
9. See, e.g., GRECIANO, supra note 6, at 220-23 (discussing recent reforms to German
retirement system).
10. This is not to suggest, however, that European countries have resolved all of the
financial difficulties faced by their retirement systems as a result of the aging of their
populations. Indeed, the retirement systems in many European countries continue to face
long-term financing difficulties. See European Union Must Undertake Radical Pension
Reform, Group Says, 31 BNA Pension & Benefits Rep. 1665, 1665 (2004).
The European Union must undertake radical reform of its pension system,
raise the retirement age, reduce budget deficits, promote citizen savings,
enhance labor mobility, boost economic productivity and allow more
immigration if it is to avert a looming fiscal crisis in the coming decades
due to low birth rates and an ageing population, the European Banking
Federation said July 29.
Id.
11. Cf Fay Lomax Cook & Lawrence R. Jacobs, Assessing Assumptions about
Americans' Attitudes Toward Social Security: Popular Claims Meet Hard Data, in THE
FUTURE OF SOCIAL INSURANCE: INCREMENTAL ACTION OR FUNDAMENTAL REFORM 82, 92 (Peter

Edelman et al. eds., 2002) (noting that "[b]etween January 1993 and December 1999, Congress

held 40 hearings that focused at least in part on the privatization of Social Security.")
12. For purposes of this Article, the term Social Security is used to refer to cash benefits
provided by the United States' Old-Age, Survivors' and Disability Insurance program. See
Kathryn L. Moore, Privatizationof SocialSecurity: MisguidedReform, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 131,
131 n.2 (1998) (citing authorities showing that this is the generally accepted meaning of the
term in the United States).
13. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
There have been modest amendments to the Social Security system since 1983. See, e.g.,
Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-182, 114 Stat. 198 (2000)
(eliminating the retirement earnings test for beneficiaries at or above the normal retirement
age). Congress, however, has not substantially amended the program in order to address its
long-term funding deficit since 1983.

Reforming Retirement Systems

reform of its Social Security system in the last twenty years.

II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH RETIREMENT SYSTEM
PRIOR TO THE 2003 REFORM
France, like the United States, provides retirement income principally
through a three tier system. The three tiers in the two countries, however, differ. In
France, the three tiers consist of (1) mandatory base regimes, (2) mandatory14
complementary retirement regimes, and (3) optional supplemental retirement plans.
In the United States, in contrast, the three tiers consist of (1) a mandatory base
regime, (2) optional employer-sponsored pensions, and (3) individual savings.'15 This
section will briefly describe each of the three tiers of the French retirement system
prior to the 2003 reform and explain how they resemble and differ from their
American counterparts.

A. The First Tier
In the United States, the first tier of the retirement system consists of a single
mandatory base regime, Social Security, which covers about 96 percent of the
American workforce. 16 In France, in contrast, there are more than 125 different
mandatory base regimes that are typically divided into four different categories: (1)
the general regime, (2) the special regimes, (3) the agricultural regime, 17 and (4) the
regimes for non-agricultural, non-wage earners (that is, the self-employed).' 8 The
14. See JEAN-PAUL GALLAS & NICOLAS CORATO, VOS RETRAITES APRIS LA REFORME 17
(2003); GRECIANO, supranote 6, at 25.
15. See Christopher Bone, An Actuarial Perspectiveon How Social Security Reform
Could Influence Employer-SponsoredPensions,in PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
333, 333 (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1999) (describing the American retirement system as a
three-legged stool consisting of Social Security, employer-sponsored retirement plans, and
individual savings). Of course, retirement income in France can be supplemented by
individual savings, which is sometimes referred to as the fourth tier of the French retirement
system. See Philippe Laigre & Pierre Mascomere, La Retraite Supplementaire, LIAISONS
SOCIALES, Nov. 1995, at 10.
16. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 11 (2002).
17. Historically, the agricultural regime was an independent regime. Now, however, it is
aligned with the general regime so that it provides the same benefits as the general regime and
is financially integrated with the general regime. Accordingly, some commentators and
experts do not separate the agricultural regime from the general regime in describing the base
regimes. See, e.g., CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, supra note 2, at 51-52.
18. See, e.g., OBSERVATOIRE DES RETRAITES, RETIREMENT PENSIONS: A STATISTICAL
http://www.observatoireat
available
4
(2003),
ANALYSIS
retraites.org/versionanglaise/letters/lorc3eng.pdf (last visted Apr. 19, 2005); GALLAS &
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general regime is by far the most important in terms of coverage. It covers virtually
all wage earners in the private sector, or about 67 percent of the French workforce.19
The 120 or so special regimes, covering about 20 percent of the French workforce
(principally public sector employees), are the next most significant.2" About 10
percent of the French workforce is affiliated with one of the five non-agricultural,
non-wage earner regimes 21 while the remaining 3 percent of the workforce is
affiliated with the agricultural regime. 22
Like the American Social Security system, 23 the mandatory base regimes in
France are typically defined benefit plans funded principally on a pay-as-you-go
basis. The benefit formulas, however, differ significantly from regime to regime.
Until the 2003 reform, the special regimes were typically the most generous while the
were the least generous, and the general
non-agricultural, non-wage earner regimes
24
regime fell somewhere in the middle.
The general regime's benefit formula is often described as providing an
annual pension (P) equal to (S.A.M.) x (t) x (d/D), where S.A.M. = average annual
salary, t = rate, d = duration of participation in the general regime, and D = maximum
duration of participation taken into account. 25 The special regimes generally take the
same factors in account in calculating retirement benefits, but define them quite
differently. 26 Finally, the non-agricultural, non-wage earner regimes tend to use very
CORATO, supra note 14, at 20; BONOLI, supra note 8, at 127.
19. Cf GRECIANO, supra note 6, at 27 tbl. 1 (showing that as of July 1, 2000, 15,413,792

out of the 23,053,055 individuals who contributed to a first tier regime contributed to the
general regime.
20. Cf id. (showing that as of July 1,2000,4,664,260 out of the 23,053,055 individuals

who contributed to a first tier regime contributed to one of the special regimes).
21. Cf. id (showing that as of July 1, 2000,2,301,825 out of the 23,053,055 individuals

who contributed to a first tier regime contributed to one of the non-agricultural non-wage
eamer regimes).
22. Cf id. (showing that as of July 1, 2000, 673,178 out of the 23,053,055 individuals

who contributed to a first tier regime contributed to the agricultural regime).
23. For a general overview of the American Social Security system's funding and benefit
formula, see Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under the CurrentAmerican Social Security
System, 61 U. Pirr. L. REv. 955, 983-90 (2000).

24. See Didier Blanchet & Florence Legros, France:The Diffcult Path to Consensual
Reforms, in SOCIAL SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN EUROPE 109, 111-13 (Martin Feldstein &

Horst Siebert eds., 2002).
25. See, e.g., Pierre Mayeur, La loi du 21 aolt 2003, REGARDS SUR L'ACTUALITE 6, 13
(2003); JEAN-JACQUES DUPEYROUX, DROIT DE LA SECURITE SOCIALE 472 (13th ed., 1998);
Emmanuelle Walraet & Ronan Mahieu, SimulatingRetirement Behavior: The CaseofFrance,
in INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY, PHASE 3 (Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise eds.,

forthcoming publication) (manuscript at 4, on file with author).
26. The special regime formula can be described in one of two ways:
1) 2 percent x years of service (capped at 37.5) x final gross salary
(excluding bonuses), or

Reforming Retirement Systems

different factors to calculate benefits.
Both the general regime and the special regimes for civil servants and
military personnel, the most significant of the special regimes, 27 base benefits on
wages. Specifically, the general regime bases benefits on average annual salary,
defined as the average of the retiree's highest 25 years of earnings. 28 The special
regimes for civil servants and military personnel, in contrast, base benefits on final
salary, defined as the retiree's final six month's of pay. 29 Because wages tend to
increase over time, the wage factor of the special regimes' benefit formula tends to be
much more generous than that of the general regime.30
As noted above, the second element of the benefit formula is the rate. For
purposes of the general regime, the rate is capped at 50 percent and is generally a
function of the age at which the retiree begins to collect benefits and the amount of
time the retiree -contributes to the general regime. Generally, an individual may retire
2) .75 (rate) x (years of service (capped at 37.5)/total years of service
taken into account (37.5)) x final gross salary (excluding bonuses).
Compare OBSERVATOIRE DES RETRAITES, ANALYSE DE LA LOI 2003-775 DU 21 AOQT 2003
PORTANT

RFORME

DES

RETRAITES

2,

available

at

http://www.observatoire-

retraites.org/observatoire/rubriques/dossisers/project loi/analyse.htm (last visited Apr. 12,
2005) [hereinafter ANALYSE DE LA LOI] with C. DES PENSIONS CIy. ET MILTARES art. 13
(effective prior to Jan. 1, 2004) (Fr.) (describing the benefit formula in the first way) and
Walraet & Mahieu, supranote 25, at 6 (describing the benefit formula in the second way).
The advantage of the first formula is that it is easier to understand. The benefit of the second
formula is that it makes it easier to compare the special regime formula with that of the general
regime. For this reason, this section will focus on the second formula.
27. Although there are more than 120 different special regimes, only about 15 accept
new participants. See DUPEYROUX, supra note 25, at 791 & n.4. Moreover, the benefit
formulas and management of these special regimes are generally similar. See GRECIANO,
supra note 6, at 35; GALLAS & CORATO, supra note 14, at 73. Thus, in discussing the special
regimes, this section will focus on the special regimes for civil servants and military personnel
because they are the most significant in terms of coverage (they cover about half of all special
regime participants) and are reasonably representative of the terms of most of the other special
regimes For a more detailed description of some of the other special regimes, see GREcLANO,
supra note 6, at 35-43.
28. For retirees reaching age 60 before January 1, 1994, the average annual salary is
based on the retiree's highest 10 years of earnings. In 1993, the general regime was amended
to increase the number of years taken into account by one year each year until it reaches 25 in
2008. See CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, supra note 2, at 55.
29. See CONSEIL DORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, supra note 2, at 55. For these purposes,

final salary excludes bonuses, which on average represent about 15 percent of total net income
(and up to 50 percent of net income for some categories of civil servants). See Walraet &
Mahieu, supra note 25, at 6.
30. Indeed, most of the other special regimes are even more generous than the special
regimes for civil servants and base benefits on the final month of pay (including some
bonuses). CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, supra note 2, at 55.
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at age 60 and receive benefits at the full rate of 50 percent under the general regime if
the individual contributed to the general regime for at least 40 years. 31 In the
alternative, individuals are eligible for benefits at the full rate of 50 percent regardless
of the number of years of participation if they wait to retire until age 65 .32 For
individuals who elect to retire before they are eligible for the full rate, the rate is
generally decreased by 2.5% for each missing quarter of participation. 33 For purposes
of the special regimes for civil servants and military personnel, participants earn
benefits at the rate of two percent per year for up to 37 2 years of service. 34 Thus, if
an individual participates in the special regimes for 37 /2 years, the participant is
entitled to a benefit of seventy-five percent of final salary. There is no adjustment for
age and thus the benefit is not reduced if the participant begins to collect benefits
before age sixty-five (so long as the participant has at least 37 /2 years of service).35
The final element of the general regime formula is the ratio of the duration of
participation in the general regime (capped at 150 quarters) to the maximum number
of quarters of participation taken into account (150). Thus, if an individual
contributes to the general regime for less than 150 quarters, the individual's retirement
benefit will be reduced. As noted above, participants in the special regimes for civil
servants and military personnel earn benefits at the rate of 2% per year. If an
individual participates in the special regimes for less than 37 /2 years, the participant's
benefit will be less than 75 percent of final salary. 36 In addition, an individual must
contribute to the special regimes for at least 15 years in order to be eligible to receive
benefits.37

31. The 1993 reform not only amended the definition of average annual salary for
purposes of the general regime, but also gradually increased the number of years of
participation required to receive benefits at the full rate of 50 percent at age 60. Retirees
reaching age 60 prior to January 1, 1994, are entitled to begin collecting benefits at age 60 at
the maximum rate of 50 percent after 37.5 years of participation. For retirees reaching age 60
on or after January 1, 1994, the number of years required for benefits at the maximum rate
gradually increased to 40 beginning in 2003. Mayeur, supra note 25, at 6-7.
32. See DUPEYROUX, supra note 25, at 474; WALRAET & MAHIEU, supra note 25, at 4.
33. See Jacques Bichot, Les rachatsd'annuit~sauthorisgsparla loi du 21 aofit2003: un
bel exemple d'effet Matthieu, DROIT SOCIAL, Apr. 2004, at 408,409. The missing quarters are
based on the lesser of the number of quarters required until the individual reaches age 65 or the
number of quarters required for the full rate at age 60 (160 quarters as of 2008).
34. Mayeur, supra note 25, at 12. If a participant retires with less than 37.5 years of
service, then the participant's benefit will be necessarily be less than 75 percent pursuant to the
benefit formula. Id.
35. See id.;

CONSEIL DORIENTATION DES RETRAITES,

supra note 2, at 55; GRECIANO,

supra note 6, at 37; Walraet & Mahieu, supra note 25, at 6.
36. See Walraet & Mahieu, supra note 25, at 6.
37. C.

DES PENSIONS CIV. ET MILITAIRE DE RETRAITE

art. L(4) (Fr.). Individuals who

have participated less than 15 years are covered by the general regime and a special mandatory
complementary retirement regime for civil servants, IRCANTEC. See GALLAS & CORATO,
supra note 14, at 74; GRECIANO, supra note 6, at 37.
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The agricultural regime and a couple of the non-agricultural non-wage
earner regimes are aligned with the general regime so that they have almost identical
benefit formulas. 38 The remaining non-agricultural non-wage earner regimes,
however, have very different benefit formulas. For example, the regime for the
liberal professions bases benefits on a percentage of the AVTS (a minimum old age
benefit). 39

B. The Second Tier
The second tier of the French retirement system, the mandatory
complementary retirement regimes, has no analog in the United States. The
mandatory complementary retirement regimes are typically funded principally on a
pay-as-you go basis and distribute benefits through a points system, sort of pay-asyou go defined contribution plans. Throughout their working lives, participants
accumulate points in proportion to their contributions. Their pension benefits are then
based on their total accumulated points multiplied by the value of a point, which is
fixed each year.40
There are seven different mandatory complementary retirement regimes.
The two most significant are ARRCO and AGIRC, 4' which cover most private sector
employees. 42 In addition, most participants in the non-agricultural non-wage earner
43
base regimes are covered by separate mandatory complementary retirement regimes.
Most special regime participants, however, are not covered by a mandatory
complementary regime. 44 Instead, the special regimes typically provide such
generous benefits that the special regime benefits are about equal to or may even
exceed the combined benefits private sector employees receive from the general

38, See CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, supra note 2, at 51-52 (noting that
agricultural regime, regime for craftsmen, and regime for industrialists and merchants are
aligned with general regime); DUPEYROUX, supra note 25, at 47 1.
39. See GRECtANO, supra note 6, at 49.
40. See Moore, supra note 4, at 459-67 (describing the two principal mandatory
complementary regimes, ARRCO and AGIRC, in greater detail); See also GREcIANO, supra

note 6, at 51-60 (describing second tier in more detail).
41. Cf DUPEYROUX, supra note 25, at 973, 986, 988 & n.4 (including IRCANTEC, a
mandatory complementary retirement regime for contract employee of the public and
parapublic sector who are also covered by the general regime, as one of the three principal
mandatory complementary retirement regimes).
42. See OBSERVATOIRE DES RETRAITES, supra note 18, at 4. ARRCO and AGRIC also
cover agricultural employees covered by the agricultural regime. Id.
43. See id.

44. See GRECIANO, supra note 6, at 51 (noting that with a few exceptions, public sector
employees do not participate in a complementary regime because their base benefits are
judged to be sufficient).
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C. The Third Tier
The third tier of the French retirement system consists of optional
supplementary occupational plans. Like American employer-sponsored pension
plans, optional supplementary occupational plans are usually pre-funded, receive
favorable tax treatment, and are offered by individual employers. 46 The principal
difference between optional supplementary occupational plans in France and
employer-sponsored plans in the United States is the role they play in the retirement
system. In the United States, about half of the workforce participates in an employersponsored pension plan,47 and these plans hold over four trillion dollars in assets.48 In
France, in contrast, employer-sponsored pre-funded plans have played a negligible
role in the retirement system, 49 although in recent years the French have seriously
debated expanding the role of private pensions. °

III. OVERVIEW OF THE 2003 REFORM
Prior to the summer of 2003, the French retirement system faced serious
45. See Anne Lavigne, Pension Funds in France:Still a Dead End?, 28 THE GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 127, 146 (2003); GRECiANO, supra note 6, at 27; Jean-Luc
Grdau, Fonds depension: les grandes illusions, LE DEBAT, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 18, 21.
46. See Moore, supra note 4, at 469-71 (describing supplementary occupational plans in
detail); GRECIANO, supranote 6, at 60-68; FRANOIS CHARPENTIER, RETRAITES ET FONDS DE
PENSION: L'ETAT DE LA QUESTION EN FRANCE ET A L'tTRANGER 264-335 (3d ed. 1997).
47. See PATRICK J. PURCELL, RETIREMENT SAVINGS AND HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN 2000: A
SUMMARY OF RECENT DATA, at CRS-3 (Congressional Research Service, 2003).
48. PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 12, PRIVATE
PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 1999 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS 11 tbl. A5 (2004),
availableat http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/1999pensionplanbulletin.pdf (last visited Apr. 18,

2005).
49. "According to survey data by INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic
Studies] in 2000, 12 per cent [sic] of French households have voluntary retirement savings
through complementary collective pension schemes." Lavigne, supra note 45, at 132; see also
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: A NEW CONSENSUS 87 tbl.5.2 (2001),

availableathttp://www.ilo.org/public/English/protection/socsec/download/aconsens.pdf (last
visited Apr. 18, 2005) (showing that pension assets represent 3 percent of GNP in France
compared to 66 percent of GNP in the United States); CHARPENTIER, supra note 46, at 255-56
& tbl. 1 (noting that in 1995, the first two tiers of French retirement system paid about 900
billion francs in benefits compared to the third of the French retirement system which only
collected about 10 billion francs in contributions).
50. See Kathryn L. Moore, Lessonsfrom the FrenchFundingDebate, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
5, 12-20 (2004) (discussing this debate).
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short-term as well as long-term funding difficulties. The Pension Stewardship
Council predicted that by 2020 benefits from the general regime would exceed
contributions by over 10 billion Euros 5' and benefits under the special regimes for
civil servants and military personnel would exceed contributions by over 20 billion
Euros. 2 The Pension Stewardship Council further predicted that by 2040, general
regime benefits would exceed general regime contributions by 40 to 50 billion Euros
and benefits under the special regimes for civil servants and military personnel would
exceed contributions by almost 40 billion Euros.53
In order to address these looming deficits, the French government enacted its
most recent reform of the French retirement system in the summer of 2003.54 The
reform is noteworthy for its breadth. In the past, most reforms have addressed
relatively narrow segments of the French retirement system. For example, in 1993,
the French legislature enacted a significant reform of the first tier general regime for
private sector employees. In 1995, the French government tried to reform the first
tier special regimes for public employees. 56 In 1997, the French legislature sought to
expand the "third tier" of the French retirement system by creating retirement savings
57
plans (plans d'jpargneretraite),which were quite similar to American 401(k) plans.
Unlike the preceding reforms, the 2003 reform touched a wide variety of
elements of the French retirement system. It affected not only the first tier general
regime for private sector employees but also the most significant special regimes, the
special regimes for civil servants and military personnel.58 It created a new second

51. The Pension Stewardship Council used two different sets of actuarial assumptions to
assess the general regime. Under one set of assumptions, general regime benefits were
expected to exceed general regime contributions by 10.9 million Euros by 2020. Under the
other set of assumptions, the gap was predicted to be 15.2 million Euros. CONSEIL
D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, supra note 2, at 131.
52. Id.
53. Id. In 1999, a reserve was established to help address the general regime's long-term
funding deficit. See Law No. 98-1194 of Dec. 1998 art.2, J.O., Dec. 27, 1998, p. 19646 (Fr.).
Contributions to the reserve plus earnings on those contributions are expected to reach 1
trillion Euros in 2020 when it will begin to be drawn down to help finance benefits between
2020 and 2040. CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES RETRA1TES, supra note 2, at 133-34. The reserve
may cover as much as half of the financing deficit between 2020 and 2040. Id. at 134.
54. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003, J.O., Aug. 22, 2003, p. 143 10 (Fr.). See Moore,
supranote 50, at 12-20 (discussing past reforms of the French retirement system); see also
Moore, supra note 4, at 475-83.
55. Law No. 93-936 of July 22, 1993, J.O., July 23, 1993, p. 10374 (Fr.).
56. For a brief description of then-Prime Minister Alain Juppd's failed efforts to reform
the special regimes in 1995, see discussion infra Part IV.B.
57. Law No. 97-277 of Mar. 25, 1997, J.O., Mar. 26, 1997, p. 4657 (Fr.). The decrees

required to give effect to the legislation, however, were never promulgated, and the law was
eventually abrogated. See Lavigne, supranote 45, at 128; Moore, supra note 4, at 472.
58. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 21-80.
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tier mandatory complementary retirement regime for shopkeepers and industrialists.5 9
Finally, it expanded the third tier of the French retirement system by introducing a
new retirement savings
vehicle (le plan parternariald'9pargnesalarialvoluntaire
60
pour la retraite).
The only significant element of the French retirement system that the 2003
reform did not touch was the special regimes for employees in publicly-owned
companies such as railway workers (SNCF), Paris transport employees (RA TP), and
power utility workers (EDF-GDF). The official explanation offered for their
exclusion was that because the rules for these special regimes are fixed by decree
rather than law, the primary responsibility for reform of these regimes should come
from the enterprise rather than the National Assembly. 61 Cynics, however, contend
that the reform specifically excluded these special regimes because the employees of
these publicly-owned companies were particularly powerful in striking against the
proposed reform in 1995, and the government sought to eliminate their ability to
derail the proposed reform by excluding them from the reform.62 Regardless of the
government's motive, the General Confederation of Labor (Confidkration gdnrale
du travail (CGT)) called on these employees to strike against the proposed reform,
and they did in fact participate
in the demonstrations despite the fact that the reform
63
did not concern them.
59. Id. art. 108-09.
60. Id. art. 109. Originally, the Fillon plan also introduced a new retirement savings
plan (le plan d'Opargnepour la retraite)that was similar, but not identical to the retirement
savings plans introduced by the Thomas law. See MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES, DU
TRAVAIL ET DE LA SOLIDARITE, REPUBLIQUE FRAN(AIS, PROJET DE LOI PORTANT REFORME DES

RETRAITEs art. 79, NOR: SOCX030005L/B1 (2003), available at http://www.fonctionpublique.retraites.gouv.fr/data/Public/documents/retraitespjl.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
That plan, however, was replaced with an individual retirement savings plan (leplan d'pargne
individuelpourla retraite)that is provided on an individual rather than a collective basis. See
Loi no. 2003-775, Art 108. See also EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OBSERVATORY ONLINE,

PENSION

REFORM

ADOPTED,

http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/print/2003/09/feature/frO309103f.html

2005) [hereinafter,
61.

available

at

(last visited Apr. 17,
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See Mayeur, supra note 25, at 7; M. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Discours du Premier
Ministre au Conseil dconomique et social, in Aux SOURCES DE LA LOI: REFORME DES
RETRAITES, Oct. 2003, at 5, 10 (author's translation) [hereinafter Discours de Raffarin]; cf
Hervd Nathan, Les retraitesparachevds: Vote solemnel de la loi ce matin. Les principaux
points du texte, LIBERATION, July 24, 2003, at 12 (Frangois Chdrque, head of the CFDT, said
that the government was wise to treat the general problem and not include the special regimes
but that someday the beneficiaries of these regimes must open the debate to guarantee the
future of their retirement system).
62. Eric Le Boucher, Tous coupables du blocage, LE MONDE, June 2, 2003, at 52; cf.
Frangois Molho, Les privilgs qui ne sont pas (encore) touch~s, 142 CAPITAL 126 (2003)
(noting that the government, who well knows these workers' capacity for nuisance and
remembers the 1995 strikes, promised that it was not its intention to modify their entitlement).
63. See Marion Nowak, News From France:Stop the Strikes?, BONJOUR PARIS, June 16,
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In addition to its wide-ranging nature, the 2003 reform is noteworthy for its
speed. On January 6, 2003, President Jacques Chirac officially launched the reform,64
popularly known as the "Fillon plan," 65 after the Minister of Social Affairs Frangois
Fillon who was assigned primary responsibility for the reform,66 and by August 2003,
the Fillon plan was enacted into law and published in the Official Journal.
The law consists of 116 articles.67 This section will not attempt to describe
each article of the law69in great detail. 68 Instead, it will simply describe the principal
provisions of the law.

A. Participation Requirement
The first, and most controversial,7 ° change wrought by the 2003 reform was
an increase in the number of years of participation required to receive benefits at the
full rate. As noted in the preceding section,71 prior to the 2003 reform, participants in
the general regime were required to contribute to the general regime for forty years in
order to be eligible for benefits at the full rate at age sixty while special regime
participants were only required to contribute to the special regimes for 37 1/2 years in
order to be eligible to receive benefits at the full rate.
2003, availableat http://www.bonjourparis.com/articles.php?articleld=618; Natacha Tatu, "Le
", LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, June 5-11, 2003, at 56; Le

Jour oi on nous cherchera. .
Boucher, supranote 62, at 52.

64. M. Jacques Chirac, Allocution du President de la Rrpublique A loccasion des voeux
aux forces vives (Jan. 6, 2003), excerpts reprintedin Aux SOURCES DE LA Loi: R1tFORME DES
RETRAITES, Oct. 2003, at 1-4 (author's translation).
65. See, e.g., Thierry Fabre, Retraite: ce qui vous attend, 142 CAPITAL 112, 114 (2003)
(referring to the Fillon plan); Frangois Wenz-Dumas, Retraites: au Snat, le PSjouele droit;II
exploite une faille sur la pension des fonctionnaires, LIBERATION, July 5-6, 2003, at 15
(referring to the "Fillon law project").
66. Discours de Raffarin, supra note 61, at 5, 12.
67. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003, J.O., Aug. 22, 2003, p. 14 3 10 (Fr.).
68. Nor will the article address the decrees enforcing the law that were promulgated
since August 2003.
69. For a more detailed overview of the changes wrought by the 2003 reform, see, for
example, Mayeur, supra note 25, at 10-32; ANALYSE DE LA LOI, supra note 26.
70. Frangois Wenz-Dumas, Chirac dcret un allongement des retraits; Une session
extraordinairedu Parlementpour continuer l'examen du projet, LIBERATION, June 28-29,
2003, at 14 (describing the provision extending the years of participation required for full
benefits for the special regime for civil servants as the provision that put one two million
demonstrators on the street in May and June); Frangois Wenz-Dumas, Le Stnat prend les
retraites: L'examen, qui dibute aujourd'hui,promet d'etre moins long qu'ai lAssembl;e,
LIBERATION, July 7, 2003, at 13 (quoting a Senator, who was also a member of the Socialist
Party, as saying that they were going to object, above all, to the reform provision extending the
years of participation required for full benefits for the special regime for civil servants).
71. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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The 2003 reform gradually increases the number of years of participation
required to receive benefits at the full rate in the special regimes for civil servants and
military personnel. 72 Specifically, it increases the participation requirement by 6
months each year until it reaches 40 in 2008. 73 This change, which aligns the
participation period in the special regimes for civil servants and military personnel
with that of the general regime, 74 is particularly noteworthy because in 1995 thenPrime Minister Alain Jupp6 proposed a similar change, but his proposal was
abandoned in large part due to massive protests staged by public sector and other
workers covered by the special regimes.75 In 2003, unions again protested the
proposed change 76 but failed to prevent it.
The 2003 reform did not stop with aligning the special regime's participation
requirement with that of the general regime. Instead, it went further and instituted
additional increases in both regimes.77 Specifically, it provides that beginning in
2009, the participation requirement in both regimes will increase by one quarter a
year until it reaches 41 in 2012.78 Moreover, beginning in 2016, the participation
requirement will increase by one quarter a year until it reaches 42 in 2020. 79 These
increases, however, depend on future employment trends and the financial situation of
the retirement regimes.8 0 If unemployment rates remain elevated and companies
continue to terminate their older workers, 8' it is unlikely that these increases will be
72. See Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 5, J.O., Aug. 22, 2003, p. 14 3 10 (Fr.).
73. See id.; see also ANALYSE DE LA LOI, supra note 26.
74. In light of this change, the special regime benefit can no longer be expressed as 2
percent per year x years of service (up to 37.5) x final gross pay (excluding bonuses).
Compare note 26, supra. Instead, the special regime benefit must now be expressed as .75
percent x (quarters of participation (up to 160)/maximum number of quarters of participation
taken into account (160)) x final gross pay (excluding bonuses). See Law No. 2003-775 of
Aug. 21, 2005 art. 51.
75. See Bruno Palier &Giuliano Bonoli, La mont~e en puissance desfonds depension:
Une lecture comparative des reformes des syst4mes de retraite, entre module global et
cheminements nationaux, 4 L'ANNtE DE LA REGULATION 210, 227 (2000); Giuliano Bonoli,
PensionPoliticsin France:Patternsof Co-Operationand Conflict in Two Recent Reforms, 20

W. EUR. POL. 111 (1997).
76. For descriptions of the protests, see, e.g., Vaiju Naravane, Raffarin unmoved as
strike continues, THE HINDu, June 12, 2003, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/the

hindu/2003/06/12/stories/2003061204671400.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); Jean-Marie
Godard, New Strikes Loom Over Government's Pension Reform Plans,INTERNAT'L HERALD
TRIB., May 26, 2003; Charles Bremner, FranceHaltedby Union ProtestOver Pension Plan,
THE TIMES (LONDON), May 14, 2003.
77. The changes also apply to the other base regimes that are aligned with the general
regime. See Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 5(V), J.O., Aug. 22, 2003, p. 14 3 10 (Fr.).
78. See id.
art. 5(111).
79. See id. art. 5(V).
80. See id.
81. For a discussion of the low employment rate of older workers in France, see, for
example, Xavier Gaullier, La r~forme des retraiteset les entreprises:quellesfins de carri~re?,
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implemented.

82

B. Ratio of Participation Requirement
As described in the preceding section, 83 the third element of the general
regime formula is the ratio of the duration of participation in the general regime
(capped at 150 quarters) to the maximum number of quarters of participation taken
into account (150). Thus, if an individual contributes to the general regime for less
than 150 quarters, the individual's retirement benefit will be reduced. The 2003
reform gradually increases the number of quarters of participation taken into account
for these purposes to 160 so that by 2008, an individual's benefit will be reduced if4
the individual contributes to the general regime for less than 160 quarters.
Similarly, if a participant in the special regimes for civil servants and military
personnel contributes to the special regimes for less than 160 quarters, that
participant's retirement benefit will also be reduced.85

C. Reduction for Early Retirement
As discussed in the preceding section, the general regime benefit rate for
individuals who retire before age sixty-five with less than 160 quarters of
participation is reduced by 2.5% for each missing quarter. The 2003 reform gradually
86
reduces this penalty from 2.5% per quarter or 10% per year to 5% per year.
Prior to the 2003 reform, there was no such reduction for early retirees under
the special regimes. The 2003 reform gradually introduces a five percent per year
reduction for retirees
who retire early under the special regimes for civil servants and
87
military personnel.

D. Delayed Retirement Credit

June 2004, at 64 (noting that in France, the employment rate of 55 to 64 year
olds is only 32 percent).
82. See Mayeur, supra note 25, at 16; Caroline Brizard, Le sort des retraitesdans le
projet:Les sacrificesque demandeFillon,LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, May 29-June 4,2003, at
DROIT SOCIAL,

52.
83. See discussion supra Part I.A.
84. See Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21,2003 art. 22, J.O., Aug. 22,2003, p. 14 3 10 (Fr.).
85. Id. art. 51.
86. See Bichot, supra note 33, at 409; Brizard, supra note 82, at 52; Mayeur, supranote
25, at 14. Although this provision is frequently discussed as part of the 2003 law, it was not
actually part of the law itself but was put into effect by a decree entered February 13, 2003.
See Bichot, supra note 33 (citing d~cret no. 2004-144 du 13 fdvrier 2004).
87. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 51.
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Prior to 2003, neither the general regime nor the special regimes provided
individuals with any incentive to delay retirement beyond the date at which they were
entitled to full retirement benefits (age 60 with 40 years of service for purposes of the
general regime or 37.5 years of service for purposes of the special regimes). The
2003 law introduces a delayed retirement credit for both regimes. Specifically, for
purposes of the general regime, individuals entitled to benefits at the full rate of
50%88 who continue to work beyond age 60 will earn an additional .75% per quarter
or 3% per year until they reach age 65.89 Similarly, for purposes of the special
regimes for civil servants and military personnel, individuals with full careers 90 who
continue to work beyond age 60 will earn an additional .75% per quarter or 3% per
year for up to five years. 91 This was one of a number of measures of the 2003 reform
that was explicitly intended to encourage French workers to extend their working
lives and combat France's perennial unemployment problem.92

E. Early Retirement for Individuals who Began to Work at Very Young Age
Prior to 2003, individuals could not begin to receive benefits from the
general regime until they reached age 60. The 2003 reform authorizes participants
who begin to work at a very young age to begin receiving retirement benefits from the
general regime at a younger age if their working careers are sufficiently long.93
Specifically, individuals who begin to work at age 14 or 15 and contribute to the

88. Currently individuals must work for 40 years in order to receive benefits at the full
rate of 50 percent. The number of years of service required to receive benefits at the full rate
is gradually increased from 40 years to 41 and later 42 years. See supra pg. 262.
89. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 25; ANALYSE DE LA LOI, supranote 26, at 3.

Individuals who continue to work beyond age 65 will only accumulate additional retirement
benefits if they have less than 40 years of service and thus have their benefits reduced under
the third element of the benefit formula (duration of participation in the general regime/total
participation taken into account (40 years)). See id.
90. A full career will gradually increase from 37.5 years to 40 years beginning in 2004.
In addition, a full career is scheduled to later increase to 41 and ultimately 42 years. See supra
pg. 262.
91. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 51, J.O., Aug. 22, 2003, p. 14 3 10 (Fr.).
92. For additional changes that are intended to foster employment for individuals over
the age of 55, see Mayeur, supra note 25, at 19; EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
OBSERVATORY ON-LINE,

GOVERNMENT'S PENSION REFORM TAKES SHAPE, available at

http://ww.eiro.eurofound.ie/print/2003/05/feature/fr0305I03f.html (last visited Apr. 1,2005).
93. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 23. The 2003 law does not establish the
specific parameters for eligibility for early retirement benefits, but instead provides that the
rules are to be established by decree. Id. It also provides that the decree is to establish rules
pursuant to which credit for national service may be awarded. Id. It is estimated that the

provision may affect 270,000 people and could cost between 600 and 700 million Euros over a
10-year period.

EIRONLINE, PENSION REFORM ADOPTED, supra note

60.
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general regime for 42 years may be entitled to begin to receive benefits at age 56 or
57.94 Individuals who begin their careers at age 14 or 15 and contribute to the general
regime for 41 years may be entitled to begin to receive benefits at age 58. 95 Finally,
participants who begin their careers at age 16 and contribute to the general regime for
40 years may be entitled to begin to receive benefits at age 59.96 This provision, like
the increase in the minimum benefit discussed below, 97 is viewed as a reaffirmation of
the principal of solidarity in the French retirement system, 98 and owes much to the
efforts of Frangois Chdrque, the leader of the French Democratic Confederation of
Labor (Conf~drationfranqaised~mocratiquedu travail (CFDT)), one of France's
leading trade99 union federations, in the unions' negotiations with the French
government.

F. Indexing
Prior to 2003, benefits under the general regime were indexed to changes in
prices while benefits under the special regimes were indexed to changes in wages.
The 2003 reform provides that benefits under both the general regime100 and the
regimes for civil servants and military personnel' 0 ' are to be indexed to changes in
prices.

G. Retirement Benefits while Employed
Prior to the 2003 reform, individuals could receive both wages and benefits

94. See ANALYSE DE LA LOI, supra note 26 (noting that May 14 and May 15 guidance
suggested that the decrees would contain the rules identified in the text). See also BRUNO
PALJER, LA REFORME DES RETRAITES 108 (2004) (noting that the 2003 reform announced that
individuals having contributed to the general regime for more than 40 years before age 60 and
having begun work between ages 14 and 16 would be entitled to begin to receive benefits at
age 58).
95. ANALYSE DE LA LOI, supranote 26.
96. Id.
97. See infra pg. 266.
98. Mayeur, supra note 25, at 20.
99. Prior to the negotiations with the trade unions, the government proposed to limit the
early retirement benefit to individuals who began their careers at age 14 or 15 and would have
only permitted them to retire at ages 58 or 59. See id. As a result of its negotiations with
Frangois Chdrque, the French government lowered the retirement age and extended the
benefit to individuals who began their careers at age 16. See Les concessions de Fillon, LE
NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,

at 68, 68.

100. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 27, J.O., Aug. 22, 2003, p. 14 3 10 (Fr.)
101. Id. art. 51 (amending art. L(16)).
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from the general regime so long as they worked for a new employer.10 2 Prior to the
2003 reform, the special regimes similarly did not impose any limitations on
individuals earning both wages and a pension
10 3 other than prohibiting individuals from
returning to work for their last employer.
The 2003 reform provides that individuals can now receive both wages and a
pension from the general regime so long as their wages plus pension benefit do not
exceed their last wage earned before retirement. 14 In addition, the 2003 reform
authorizes retirees to return to work for their former employer beginning six months
after retirement. 105 With respect to the special regimes for civil servants and military
personnel, the 2003 reform provides that retired civil servants can be re-employed in
civil service, but their wage may be no more then one-third of their pension. 106 This
limitation, however, does not apply to retirees who reach the applicable statutory
retirement age before 2004."07

H. Minimum Retirement Benefit
Prior to 2003, the general regime provided very low wage earners with a
minimum retirement benefit (minimum contributij)that was designed to insure that
individuals who contributed to the general regime were entitled to a greater retirement
benefit than the minimum old age benefit (minimum veillesse) available to all
individuals over the age of sixty-five regardless of whether they ever contributed to
any retirement plan. 10 8 The amount of the minimum retirement benefit was fixed by
decree and revalued each year at the same time and at the same rate as the minimum
old age benefit.' °9 Individuals who contributed to the general regime for a full 150
quarters (37 / years) were entitled to the full minimum benefit while the minimum
benefit for workers who contributed for fewer quarters was reduced proportionally.10
Just as the 2003 reform increases the number of years required for a
participant to receive full benefits under the general regime from 150 quarters to 160
quarters,"' the 2003 reform gradually increases to 160 the number of quarters
1 12
required for a worker to be entitled to receive the full minimum retirement benefit.
ANALYSE DE LA LOI, supra note 26, at 6.
103. Id.
104. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21,2003 art. 15; Mayeur, supranote 25, at 19; ANALYSE
DE LA LOI, supra note 26, at 6.
105. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 15; Mayeur, supranote 25, at 19; ANALYSE
DE LA LOI, supra note 26, at 6.
106. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 64.
107. Id.
108. DUPEYROUX, supra note 25, at 476, 1131-35.
109. ANALYSEDELA LOI, supra note 26, at 8 of 13.
110. Id.
111. See discussion supra Part III.B.
112. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 5, J.0., Aug. 22, 2003, p. 14 3 10 (Fr.).

102.
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In making this adjustment, however, the 2003 reform assures that minimum
retirement benefit (including benefits from the mandatory complementary retirement
regime, ARRCO) for workers with complete careers (that is, workers who have
contributed long enough to receive benefits at the full rate) should be equal to at least
85 percent of the minimum wage by 2008.113 Studies showed that absent reform, the
replacement rate would have decreased from 81 percent of the minimum wage to 70
percent by 2020.114 As noted above,1 5 this provision is viewed as a reaffirmation
of
16
the principal of solidarity and owes much to Frangois Ch6rque's efforts."
Prior to 2003, the special regimes for civil servants and military personnel
also provided a minimum retirement benefit."i7 The 2003 reform also modifies the
minimum retirement benefit under the special regimes for civil workers and military
personnel to reflect the increased number of quarters of participation required for
benefits at the full rate and increases the minimum retirement benefit by five
percent.118

I. Funded Savings Plans
Although the provisions regarding funded savings plans received little public
attention during the debate on the 2003 plan, the 2003 reform also includes a couple
of significant provisions affecting the third tier of the French retirement system. First,
the 2003 reform creates a new kind of individual retirement savings plan (le plan
d'9pargne individuelpourla retraite)."9 This "new individual savings plan is an

113. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21,2003 art. 4. The law cannot and does not guarantee
the total amount of the minimum retirement benefit because it depends on both the minimum
benefit provided by the general regime and the benefit provided by the second tier
complementary retirement regime, ARRCO, which is governed by the social partners and not
by the French legislature. See Mayeur, supra note 25, at 20. Instead, the law establishes this
as a socio-political objective, but in its negotiations with the social partners, the government
promised to increase the minimum contributifby three percent in three stages between 2003
and 2008. Id. at 21.
114. Mayeur, supra note 25, at 20; CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, supranote 2,
at 136.
115. See suprapg. 265.
116. The original proposal only promised minium wage workers with full careers a
benefit equal to 75 percent of the minimum wage. See Raffarin 'ferme maispasferm, " les
ngociations reprennent, LIBERATION,
May
15,
2003,
available
at
http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article= 110708 (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
117. Id.

118.

ANALYSE DE LA LOI,

supra note 26, at 8.

119. Law no. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 108, J.O., Aug. 22, 2003, p.14310 (Fr.).
Originally, the Fillon plan introduced a pension savings plan (plan d'9pargnepourla retraite),
which was collective and thus could have opened the way for pension funds. The savings plan
that was ultimately enacted, however, is provided on an individual rather than a collective
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insurance contract that [permits workers] to accumulate assets for the purchase of an
annuity."'120 Workers may contribute up to ten percent of income, capped at 24,000
Euros (about US $30,000), on a tax favored basis. 12 1 Distributions from the annuity
are subject to personal income tax. 122
The 2003 reform also introduced another new savings vehicle, the voluntary
employee pension savings plan (planparternariald' pargnesalarialvoluntairepour

la retraite).123 This new savings vehicle replaces the voluntary salary savings plan
(plan parternariald' pargne salarial voluntaire) that was created in 2001 to

encourage short- to medium-term savings. 2 4 Unlike the old voluntary salary savings
plan which required savings for a ten-year period, the new voluntary employee
pension savings plan extends the contribution period up to retirement. 2 5 Participants
can choose to receive their benefits in the form of a lump sum or annuity, and both
employee and optional employer contributions are eligible for favorable tax
treatment. 126

J. Summary

French
almost
regime
second

The 2003 reform has been described as the most significant reform of the
retirement system since the creation of the system in 1945.127 It touches
every element of the retirement system, from amending the first tier general
and special regimes for civil servants and military personnel to creating a new
tier mandatory complementary retirement regime for shopkeepers to creating a

basis. Cf EIRONLINE, PENSION REFORM ADOPTED, supra note 60. Arguably, this new
individual savings vehicle expands the fourth tier of the French retirement system, individual
savings, rather than the third tier because it is provided on an individual rather than a collective
basis.
120. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL UPDATE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FOREIGN
PUBLIC

AND

PRIVATE

PENSIONS

1

(2004),

available

at

http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intlupdate/2004-0 1/2004-01 .pdf (last visited Apr.
16, 2005).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. 109.
124. See Moore, supra note 50, at 18-20 (discussing the voluntary salary savings plans
created in 2001).
125. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 120, at 1.

126. Id.
127. See BLOOMBERG, Franceto Extend ContributionPeriodin Face ofDeficit, Apr. 25,
2003,
available
at
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=l 0000085&refer--europe&sid=aAj2U88XB GE#
(noting that Social and Labor Affairs Minister Francois Fillon described the reform as the most
significant since the creation of the system in 1945); GALLAS & CORATO, supra note 14, at v
(describing the reform as equally significant).
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new third tier savings vehicle, the voluntary employee pension savings plan.
Although the reform is significant and far-reaching, it is not revolutionary.
It steadfastly retains the basic pay-as-you go structure of the French retirement
system. Indeed, the first article of the first title of the law states that "the Nation
solemnly reaffirms its choice of a pay-as-you go retirement
system which is at the
128
heart of the social compact between generations."'
Because the reform was enacted in large part to address the system's looming
deficits, it contains a number of benefit reduction measures. For example, the most
significant, and controversial, element of the reform reduces benefits by increasing
the number of years of participation required to receive full benefits.
The reform, however, is not limited to benefit reductions. Indeed, it contains
some benefit enhancements. For example, it creates delayed retirement credits to
provide workers with an incentive to delay retirement and thus help resolve the
country's perennial unemployment problem. The reform also includes an early
retirement benefit for workers who begin their careers at a very young age; this
change is viewed as a reaffirmation of the principal of solidarity which lies at the very
heart of the French retirement system.' 29 Solidarity is similar to the American
concept of "social adequacy" 130 and assures that participants receive a minimum level
of benefits regardless of their contributions to the system and necessarily entails some
degree of redistribution.' 3 1
Overall, the 2003 reform is a comprehensive and complex piece 32
of
legislative. Although it is unlikely to resolve all ofthe system's funding difficulties
or be the final reform of the French retirement system,'33 it is a significant reform that
should do much to reduce the system's funding difficulties.

128. Law No. 2003-775 of Aug. 21, 2003 art. I, J.O., Aug. 22, 2003, p. 14310 (Fr.)
(author's translation).
129. See Soc. SEC. CODE art. L(l 11-1) (Fr.) (stating that "the French social security
organization is founded on the principal of national solidarity.")
130. See ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 10 (4 th ed. 1993) (noting that social
adequacy means that all participants should be provided a certain standard of living regardless
of their level of contributions).
131. See Moore, supra note 4, at 446 (discussing ingreater detail the concept of solidarity
in the French retirement system).
132. See Gdrard Comilleau & Henri Sterkyniak, La reforme des retraitesde 2003, bilan
et perspective, DROIT SOCIAL, Nov. 2003, at 932, 937 (noting that the 2003 reform should

resolve almost all of the system's deficit through 2020 and most of the deficit through 2040 if,
but only if, the unemployment rate decreases to 5 percent and the average retirement age
increases from 57 years to 62/2 years).
133. See Yannick Moreau, La reforme des retraites du 21 aofit 2003: une 9tape
importante dans unporcessus de long terme, DROIT SOCIAL, Nov. 2003, at 909 (contending

that the 2003 reform is unlikely to resolve all of the system's financial difficulties but is an
important step in a long-term process).
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IV. WHY THE 2003 REFORM SUCCEEDED
President Chirac and Prime Minister Raffarin were not the first government
officials to recognize the need to reform the French retirement system. In the decade
between 1993, when the French legislature made some significant reforms to the
general regime,' 34 and 2003, the French government commissioned a series of studies,
each of which recommended that the French retirement system be reformed. 135 In
addition, twice during this decade, the French government undertook, but ultimately
failed, to reform the French retirement system.' 36 This section considers why the
2003 reform succeeded after these years of failed reform attempts and inaction.

A. Public Education
In the years leading up to the 2003 reform, the French government published
a number of official studies, each of which outlined the then-present financial
situation of the French retirement system and its need for reform. 137 These studies did
not simply sit on governmental bookshelves gathering dust. Instead, they were
widely reported in the public press,138 and some were even made available to the
general public on the Internet. 39 As a result of this public education, by May 2003, a
majority of French citizens believed that reform of the retirement system was "both
inevitable and long overdue"' 140 and the figures were no longer in dispute. 141 The
134. See Law No. 93-936 of July 22, 1993, J.O., July 23, 1993, p. 10 3 74 (Fr.). See also
Moore, supra note 4 (discussing the reforms to the general regime in 1993).
135. See, e.g., CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, supra note 2; DOMINIQUE TADDtI,
JEAN-MICHEL CHARPIN & OLIVIER DAVANNE, RETRAITES CHOISIES ET PROGRESSIVES (2000);
JEAN-MICHEL CHARPIN, L'AVENIR DE NOS RETRAITES (1999).

136. In 1995, then-Prime Minister Alain Juppe tried, but failed, to reform the special
regimes. See xx infra pg. 272 and Moore, supra note 4, at 456-57. In 1997, the French

legislature sought to expand the third tier of the French retirement system by creating
retirement savings plans (plans d'4pargne retraite)but the law was officially abrogated in
2002. See Lavigne, supra note 45, at 128; Moore, supra note 4, at 471-72.
137. See supra note 135.

138. See, e.g., Fabre, supra note 65, at 114 (discussing the report by the COR (Conseil
d'orientationdes retraites)); Matthieu, Retraites:l'info et l'intox, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
June 5-11, 2003, at 52 (discussing statistics set forth in same report).
139. See, e.g., CONSEIL D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, PREMIER RAPPORT DU CONSEIL
D'ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES (2001), available at http://www.cor-retraites.fr/article25.html

(last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
140. Bruce Crumley, Season of the Strike, 161 TIME EUROPE, May 19,2003, availableat

http://www.time.com/time/Europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901030519_450946,00.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2005); see also Un Entretien Avec Alain Touraine,En France,on ne sait
toujourspasnigocier,LA VIE, June 12, 2003, at 33 (stating that everyone recognizes the need
to harmonize the retirement systems); Mayeur, supra note 25, at 9 (noting that the
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means of reform, rather than the need for reform, was the only remaining issue. 142
In outlining the proposed reform in February 2003, Prime Minister Raffarin
declared that providing the general public with information on possible solutions was
the government's first responsibility. 143 The French government sought to provide
this education, and influence public opinion, in a number of ways. First, it
established an Internet site devoted strictly to reform of the French retirement
system. 14 4 In addition, in June 2003, Prime Minister Raffarin sent each French citizen
a letter accompanied by a pamphlet entitled, "A reform for the future of our
retirements: The principal dispositions of the law project., 145 The pamphlet provided
a general description of the proposed reform, cited statistics showing the need for
reform, and concluded with a special phone number
to which individual inquiries
1 46
regarding the proposed law could be directed.
This public education appears to have played a key role in the success of the
2003 reform by gamering sufficient public support to permit the legislature to enact
the reform despite the objections of the socialist party and a number of trade union
federations. 147
"diagnostics" regarding the challenges of financing the retirement system had long been posed
and was no longer contested); Frangois Darras, GouvernementRaffarin: Les Raisons d'une
DdgrigoladeAnnoncde, MARIANNE, May 19-25, 2003, at 15, 16 (declaring that the government

had succeeded at convincing the public of the absolute need for a reform though not
necessarily the reform it proposed).
141. Fabre, supra note 65, at 114 (declaring that the numbers are indisputable, if the
French retirement system is left in its current state it will explode). See also Brice Teinturier,
Les Frangaiset la reforme des retraites,REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE, Mar./Apr.

2003, at 88, 88-89 (noting that according to a March 2003 poll, 71 percent of the respondents
that financing the French retirement system was a grave problem that urgently need to be
addressed).
142. For a description of alternative means of reform, see CinqfilonsdglaissdsparFillon,
LIBERATION, May 15, 2003, available at http://www.libe.com/page.php?Article= 110660 (last
visited Apr. 19, 2005).
143. Discours de Raffarin, supra note 61, at 12.
144. See RtPUBLIQUE FRANQAIS, SITE D'INFORMATION SUR L'AVENIR DES RETRAITES, at
http://www.retraites.gouv.fr/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
145. RtIPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, UNE REFORME POUR L'AVENIR DE NOS RETRAITEs: LES
PRINCIPALES DISPOSITIONS DU PROJET DE LOI; see Nowak, supranote 63 (noting that the letters

and pamphlets were beginning to arrive in homes on June 16).
146. Cdcil Chaptal, Un numtro indigopour communiquersurla reforme: Des retraitset
des juristsrdpndent aux questions des salariis,LIBERATION, June 20,2003, at 14 (noting that a
retired marine officer who helps answer the phones declared that they did create publicity for
the government but simply provided information).
147. Cf.Raymond Soubie, Pourlapoursuitedes reformes, LIASONS SOClA.LES, Oct. 2003,
at 90 (contending that one of the three reasons why the 2003 reform succeeded was that the
subject was prepared and publicized for more than ten years). See also Claire Gu6laud and
Phillipe Le Coeur, Le gouvernement a renonc, b une reforme globalede la santg, LE MONDE,
July 11, 2003, at 6 (noting that debate in order to educate was of primary importance in the
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B. Consultation with Trade Union Federations
In 1995, then-Prime Minister Alain Jupp6 proposed to reform the special
regimes in a manner similar to that enacted in the 2003 reform. Specifically, he
proposed, among other things,14 8 to increase the number of years of participation
required for retirement at the full rate from 37 1/2 years to forty years and to base
benefits on the best twenty-five (rather than ten years) of salary. 4
This proposed reform met with fierce public opposition. A rail strike
virtually paralyzed the country's railway system for three weeks. The rail workers
were quicklyjoined by post office employees, teachers, and other civil servants who
demonstrated daily in Paris and other cities. At the peak of demonstrations, two
million people were reported to have taken to the streets, and sizeable losses to the
French economy were reported. Unable - or unwilling - to reach an agreement with
the trade union federations, Alain Jupp6
quickly decided to abandon his proposed
50
plan to reform the special regimes.'
Like the 1995 proposed reform, the 2003 plan was met with public
demonstrations and strikes. 5 ' In contrast to 1995, however, the strikes and
demonstrations in 2003 failed to derail the proposed reform. This difference appears
to be attributable to two key factors. First, the French government made a sustained
effort to consult and negotiate with the trade union organizations. 5 2 Second, the
French government in fact reached an agreement with two trade union federations, the
French Democratic Confederation of Labor (Conf~drationsfranqaised~mocratique

du travail(CFDT)), and the French Confederation of Professional and Managerial
Staff - General Confederation of Profession and Managerial Staff (Confgderation

franqaisede l'encadrement- Confiderationg~ngral des cadres (CFE-CGC)).' 53

proposed reform of the health system just as it was of critical importance before reform of the
retirement system).
148. The proposed reform also included reforms to the country's health insurance system
that were gradually implemented throughout 1996 and 1997. Bonoli, supranote 75, at 120-21.
149. Palier & Bonoli, supra note 75, at 227; Bruno Palier, A 'Liberal'Dynamic in the
Transformationof the FrenchSocial Welfare System, in SOCIAL INSURANCE IN EUROPE 84, 104

(Jochen Clasen ed., 1997).
150. Bonoli, supra note 75, at 111.
151. See, e.g., Lepaysagesyndical remodel par deux mois difil~s, LBERATION, June 20,
2003, availableat http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=1 19170 (describing the conflict
between the trade union federations and the government as intense as that in 1995); Darras,
supranote 140, at 15, 16 (declaring that if you believe the polls, the social movement of May
2003 is even more popular than that of November-December 1995).
152. Indeed, Ernest-Antoine Seillirre, president of the employer organization Medef,
described the government's successful method of reform as consisting of "concentration,
consultation, and negotiation," Rrmis Barroux & Jean-Michel Bezat, M Seillijre: "Un vent de
reforme souffle, mais pas assezfort," LE MONDE, July 2, 2003, at 8.

153. See infra pp. 275-276.
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Commentators attribute the failure of the 1995 reform in part to the
government's failure to negotiate with the country's trade union federations prior to
introducing the reform. 154 The government developed that reform proposal in secret
and sought to force the country's social partners to accept the proposal without debate
or negotiation. (In France, employer organizations and trade union organizations are
commonly referred to as the "social partners."' 55) In 2003, in contrast, the
government developed its reform through a very public process of "debate,
156
and sought to work with the social partners
consultation, and negotiation,"'
57
throughout the process.'
Indeed, in launching the reform on January 6, 2003, President Jacques
Chirac expressly referred to the role the social partners should play in the reform: "I
am waiting for the social partners, and especially the enterprises, to play a leading
role in resolving this problem."' 58 The social partners were happy to oblige with
seven trade union organizations 5 9 signing ajoint statement on pensions setting forth
President Jacques Chirac
seven objectives in negotiating
160 reform the same day that
announced the 2003 reform.
On February 1, 2003, the trade union federations called for a joint
demonstration to encourage the government to take their demands into account in the
Between 250,000 and 500,000 people participated in these
reform. 161
154. Palier & Bonoli, supra note 75, at 227; Bonoli, supra note 75, at 120.
155. See Daniel B61and & Patrik Marier, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST AVOIDANCE: POLICY
WINDOWS, LABOR MOBILIZATION, AND PENSION REFORM INFRANCE 2 (SEDAP Res. Paper No.
114, 2004).
156. Cf.Mayeur, supra note 25, at 6 (noting that this is the first economic or social
reform to ever be the subject of such a phase of debate, concertation, and negotation).
157. In discussing their joint efforts, terms such as consultation were frequently. Fillon,
however, steadfastly refused to use the term "negotiation" in connection with the role of the
trade union federations in the reform of the retirement system. See Gudlaud & Le Coeur,
supranote 147, at 6 (noting the government's use of the term "negotiation" in connection with
proposed reform of the health system in contrast to Fillon's refusal to use the term in
connection with reform of the retirement system).
158. Chirac, supra note 64, at 1.
159. The seven trade union organizations were the CFDT, General Confederation of
Labor (Confiddration g~ndrale du travail,CGT) French Christian Workers' Confederation
(Conf~dgration frangaise des travailleurs chr~tiens, CFTC), CFE-CGC, General
Confederation of Labor-Force ouvri~re (Conf9dkrationginiraledu travail- Forceouvri~re,
CGT-FO), National Federation of Independent Unions (Union nationale des unions
autonomes, UNSA), and United Union Federation (F~ddrationsyndicaleunitaire,FSU). These
seven trade union organizations are represented on the Pensions Stewardship Council (Conseil
d'orientation des retraites). EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OBSERVATORY ON-LINE,
at
available
REFORM,
PENSIONS
LAUNCHES
GOVERNMENT
http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/print/2003/02/feature/fr03O2108f.html (last visited Apr. 6,2005)
[hereinafter EIRONLINE, GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES PENSIONS REFORM].
160. Id.
161. Id.
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demonstrations. 162 Two days later, on February 3, 2003, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre
Raffarin outlined the proposed reform process before the Economic and Social
Counsel (Conseilgconomique et social),163 a consultative body on which trade union
federations and employers' organizations are represented.' 64 Prime Minister Raffarin
described the process as one of information, dialogue, and consultation, 165 and
assured the social partners that they would play an important role in the reform
process.166
Social Affairs Minister Frangois Fillon, confirmed that "the unions will not
be spectators;"' 167 the government will consult with the trade union organizations.
parliament would vote on the reform, 168 noting
Fillon, however, was quick to add that
169
that "they are two distinct actions."'
The government was true to its promise. The government spent the months
of February and March fleshing out the principals of reform in consultation with the
social partners, 170 including a special consultation with trade union federations
representing civil servants.'71
Once the basic principals were established, the government again worked
172
with the trade union organizations to develop the specific elements of the law.
These negotiations, however, were more contentious. Unable to reach agreement
with the trade union federations and in the face of a massive public sector strike on
May 13, Social Affairs Minister Fillon declared that "the government was 'open to
to 'improve' the reform project, but not to modify its
more discussions'
71 3
fundamentals."'

162. The government estimated that about 320,000 demonstrators marched in more than
100 towns and cities while organizers contended that closer to 500,000 individuals participated
in the demonstrations. See Haifa million marchfor pension rights acrossFrance,MORNING
STAR, Feb. 3, 2003, at 3, available at 2003 WLNR 8435174.

163. Discours de Raffarin, supra note 61.
164. EIRONLINE, GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES PENSIONS REFORM, supranote 159; Discours de
Raffarin, supra note 6 1.
165. Discours de Raffarin, supra note 61, at 11.
166. Id.
167. EIRONLINE, GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES PENSIONS REFORM, supra note 159.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See B6atrice Taupin, Retraite: le Medefveut 41 ans pour tous, LE FIGARO, Mar. 21,

2003, available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/ecomonde/20030321.FIG0016.html (noting that
Fillon and Delevoye met six times with a representative from each trade union federation and
employer organization).
171. Mayeur, supra note 25, at 9.
172. Id.
173. Huge labor walkout hits France:Retirement rules at issue, MIAMI HERALD, May 14,
2003, at 6A, 2003 WL 20215831. See also Raffarin pr6ne le dialogue, les syndicats se
at
available
14,
2003,
May
LIBERATION,
divisent,

http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=1 10475 (last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (noting that the
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On May 14, Fillon, accompanied by Civil Service Minister Jean-Paul
Delevoye, met with all of the trade union federations and employer organizations and
spent a very long night negotiating with them.' 74 At the end of that night of
negotiations, Fillon and Delevoye offered 14 amendments to the initial reform
proposal, 175 but none of the trade union federations agreed to sign the proposal that
day.' 76 The following day, on May 15, talks resumed without one trade union
federation, the CGT. 177 The CGT is ideologically the furthest left on the political
spectrum and is of Communist inspiration.1 78 Within a few minutes, the next most
left trade union organization, General Confederation of Labor-Force ouvri~re
(Conftderationg~n~raledu travail- Force ouvribre(CGT-FO)) CGT-FO 179 walked
out.18 0 By the end of the day, only the two more rightist trade union federations,
CFDT, 181 and CFE-CGG, 182 and the federation representing managers, the French

areas Raffarin was open to debate included improving benefits for the lowest paid and for
those who began work at a very young age and have very long careers).
174. Specifically, they met with the General Confederation of Labour (Confrddration
g~ndral du travail, CGT); the French Democratic Confederation of Labour (Confdration
frangais d~mocratique du travail, CFDT); the General Confederation of Labour-Force ouvri&re
(Confrddration gdndral du travail-Force ouvri~re, CGT-FO); the French Christian Workers'
Confederation (Confdration frangaise des travailleurs chrdtiens, CFTC); the French
Confederation of Professional and Managerial Staff-General Confederation of Professional and
Managerial Staff (Confrddration frangaise de l'encadrement-Confddration grnrrale des
cadres, CFE-CFG); the Movement of French Enterprises (Mouvement des entrprises de
France, MEDEF); the General Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
(Confrd~ration gdnrrale des petites et moyennes entreprises, CGPME); and the Craftwork
Employers' Association (Union professionnelle artisanale, UPA). EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS OBSERVATORY ON-LINE, LATEST DEVELPMENTS IN PENSION REFORM, availableat

http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/print/2003/06/feature/fr0306104f.html [hereinafter

EIRONLINE,

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS].
175. EIRONLINE, LATEST DEVELOPMENTS,

supra note 174; Raffarin 'ferme mais pas
fermo, "les ndgociations reprennent,supranote 116. For a description of the fourteen points,
see Les 14 propositions du gouvernment, LIBERATION, May 15, 2003, available at

http://www.lib.fr/page.php?Article=l 10719 (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
176. EIRONLINE, LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 174; Raffarin "ferme mais pas
fermi," les n~gociationsreprennent,supra note 116.
177. EIRONLINE, LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 174; Raffarin 'ferme mais pas
fermi," les nigociationsreprennent,supranote 116.
178. See Bonoli, supra note 75, at n.16.

179. See id. (noting that CGT-FO "originated from a division within the CGT in 1947 and
constitutes its non-Communist component").
180. EiRONLINE, LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 174; Raffarin 'ferme mais pas
ferm6, " les nigociationsreprennent,supra note 116.

18 1. See Bonoli, supra note 75, at n. 16 (noting that the CFDT is of Socialist inspiration
and has been much more cooperative with the government than the other trade union
federations in recent years).

182. See id. (noting that the CFTC is a federation of Catholic unions).
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Democratic Confederation of Labor (Confedbrationfranqaise d~mocraticque du
and CFE-CGC, agreed to the 19
travail(CFTC))' 83 remained, and ultimately CFDT
84
elements of reform proposed by the government.'
CGT and CGT-FO, which objected to the government's proposed reform,
called for strikes and demonstrations throughout the country. 185 Despite these strikes
and objections, Fillon declared that the time for negotiations with the trade union
186
The
organizations had ended and the time for legislative debate had arrived.
government refused to reopen negotiations with the trade union federations, and
instead presented its proposal to the Counsel of Ministers which adopted it on May
28, 2003.187 Legislative debate then began on June 10, 2003, and continued despite
strikes and demonstrations throughout the country through the end of June. 188 On
July 24, 2003, the parliament ultimately approved the law, in a form that was
substantially similar to189the agreement the Raffarin government had reached with
CFDT and CFE-CGC.
Although the government did not reach an agreement with all of the trade
union organizations, its willingness to consult with the trade union federations and its
ability to reach an accord with CFDT and CFE-CGC on May 15, 2003, clearly
appeared to play a critical role in the reform's ultimate success. 190 Indeed, Prime
Minister Raffarin described their support as the key to success. 191

183. See id..
184. EIRONLINE, LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 174; Mayeur, supra note 25, at 9.
Three employer groups also supported the reform. See Signs of End to FrenchStrike Chaos:

Two French Unions Have Agreed a Compromise With the Government Over Controversial
PensionReform Plans,Easingthe Recent Travel Chaos, BBC NEWS, May 16,2003, available

at http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3032899.stm.
185. See Le paysage syndical remodelk par deux mois de ddfilis, supra note 151;
Retraites: le mouvement se durcit dans la r~gion marseillaise,LIBERATION, June 6, 2003,
availableat http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article
de dimanche sur les retraites, LIBERATION,

=

116045; Le ton monte avant la manif
2003, available at
May 23,

http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=1 12806.
186. Retraites:des centaines de milliers de manifestants dans la rue, LE MONDE, May 5,
2003, availableat http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3224-321508-,00.html.
187. Mayeur, supra note 25, at 10.
188. See Le paysage syndical remodel par deux mois de defilis, supra note 151.
189. See RtPUBLIQUE FRANIAISE, LES RETRAITES, July 30, 2003, available at
http://www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/dossier/retraitesl .htm.
190. Cf Soubie, supra note 147, at 90 (contending that one of the three reasons why the
2003 reform succeeded was that two trade union organizations, CFDT and CGC, accepted a
compromise).
191. Un dimanche chez le Premierministre: Raffarin nepensepas ic la retraite...,LE

NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, May 22-28, 2003, at 66.
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C. Political Commitment
Shortly after gaining control of the French legislature in mid-1997, thenPrime Minister Lionel Jospin and his Socialist-led coalition killed' 92 the "Thomas
law, '93 a law which was passed by the previous center-right legislature and created
retirement savings plans (plans d' pargne retraite) that were quite similar to
American 401 (k) plans. 94 For the next five years, Jospin and his coalition sponsored
95
but resolutely refused to
a series of official studies on the French retirement system'
196
agenda.
legislative
the
on
back
put pension reform
In 2002, pension reform rose to the top of the election agenda as the two
principal presidential candidates, Jospin and Incumbent President Jacques Chirac,
described pension reform as a top national legislative priority. 97 Criticizing Jospin
for his failure to reform the country's pension system during his reign, 98 Chirac
promoted "the creation of individual, complementary pension funds199'Ala fran~aise'
while Jospin vowed to protect the existing pay-as-you-go system.
192. The government "killed" the Thomas law by refusing to promulgate the seven
decrees required to give effect to the law. See Moore, supra note 4, at 472. The law was
finally abrogated in 2002. Lavigne, supra note 45, at 128; GRECIANO, supra note 6, at 185.
193. See Law No. 97-277 of Mar. 25, 1997, J.0., Mar. 26, 1997, p. 4657.
194. See Larry Speer, Pension Reform Tops French Election Agenda: Capitalization
Funds or State-Run System, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Mar. 29,2002; Moore, supra note 50,
at 17 (describing the French retirement savings plan).
195. See, e.g., CONSEIL DORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, supra note 2; Taddei et al., supra
note 135; Charpin, supra note 135.
196. Speer, supra note 194. In the election campaign, Jospin did point out that his
government created "a dedicated retirement reserve fund in Sept. 1998 to guarantee the midterm solvency of the state-run retirement system by wracking up more than $150 billion in
savings by 2020." Id.
197. See Anne Fairise & Marc Landr6, Chirac-JospinQuasi-consensussur les dossiers
sociaux, LiAsoNs SOCLALES, Apr. 2002, at 26, 28 & 32.
198. In France, during periods of co-habitation, that is, periods when the President is from
a different party than the majority of the legislators, the Prime Minister, who is a member of
the majority party, rather than the President, effectively has the real power over the legislature
in France. Thus, although Jacques Chirac was President of France during this period, he had
little ability to influence legislation because he was not a member of the Socialist party which
controlled the French parliament during this time. Cf Chirac'sNew Man Named, NEWCASTLE
HERALD (NEWCASTLE, AUSTL.), May 8, 2002, at 23 ("Without a victory in the legislative
election, Mr Chirac will find his second term reduced to the same powerlessness he suffered
during the last five years of'cohabitation' with Mr Jospin's Socialists.")
199. Speer, supra note 194. Interestingly, however, three quarters of the French
population saw little difference between the social platforms of these two candidates. See
Fairise & Landrd, supra note 197, at 26.
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On April 21, 2002, Jospin suffered a stunning defeat in the first round of the
French presidential election as Chirac and Jean-Marie Le Pen, the extreme right wing
candidate of the FrontNational,won with 19.88% and 16.86%, respectively, of the
vote.200 Jospin's loss is generally attributed more to general dissatisfaction with the
mainstream politicians than genuine support for Le Pen and his extreme right wing
views, 20 1and thousands of demonstrations denouncing Le Pen and the FrontNational
were staged shortly after the first round election.20 2
Illustrating that the Le Pen vote was more an indication of voter
dissatisfaction with the status quo than genuine support for the extreme right, Jacques
Chirac won the second round of the presidential election by a large margin with 82
percent of the vote.20 3 Then, cementing Chirac's victory, Chirac's party, l'Unionpour
la majoritprsidentielle(UMP), won a landslide victory with 366 of the 577 seats in
the French National Assembly going to members of the UMP in the legislative
elections in June 2002.2o4
According to some commentators, France was the last European country to
reform its retirement system because past governments were afraid of political
crises. 2 5 Such a fear, however, did not reign in the Chirac/Raffarin government.
Instead, Chirac, and Raffarin, whom Chirac named as Prime Minister on May 6,
2002,206 took the election victory as a mandate for change, and made a firm
commitment to reform the French retirement system. Indeed, rumors circulated at the
time that Raffarin had agreed to take the fall for Chirac should the reform fail.
Raffarin announced his intention to reform the French retirement system as
early as July 3, 2002. He declared, "Our retirement system is our common good. We
must organize ourselves so that the conditions to preserve it are united by the end of
the first quarter of 2003. "207

True to his campaign promises, President Chirac

officially launched reform of the retirement system on January 6, 2003 .208
By February 2003, retirement reform was thought to be the issue which
200. See LANNEE POLITIQUE ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE 2002, at 52, 57. Jospin came in

third with 16.18 percent of the vote. Id.
201. See Sebastian Rotella, Francegets ajoltfrom the far right - FieryJean-MarieLe
Pen earns a spot in May 5 presidentialrunoff,STAR-LEDGER (NEwARK N.J.), Apr. 23,2002, at

2 ("Analysts, however, don't see the breakthrough by Le Pen's National Front party as a
groundswell of extremist sentiment as much as a product of protest votes against a stagnant
establishment, divisions on the political left, and near-record 28 percent level of voter
absenteeism."). See also Jim Wolfreys, 'The Centre CannotHold': Fascism,the Left and The
Crisis of French Politics, 95 INTERNAT'L SOCIALISM J. 41 (2002).
202. L'ANNtE POLITIQUE ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE 2002, at 61.

203. Id. at 65.

204. Id.at 78.
205. See Retraites, un mois pour convaincre,LA

VIE,

Apr. 10, 2003, at 24, 27.

206. L'ANNtE POLITIQUE ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE 2002, at 65.

207. Mayeur, supra note 25, at 9 (quoting Prime Minister Raffarin).
208. See Chirac, supra note 64, at 1-4. See also
PENSIONS REFORM, supra note 159.
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would define, "domestically at any rate, the success or failure of Jacques Chirac's
second presidential term and Mr. Raffarin's premiership. 'If we can't reform the
pensions system in this country,
we can't reform anything,' a senior member of Mr.
209
Chirac's UMP party said.,

Believing that the credibility of the government depended on instituting this
reform, Raffarin held firm despite widespread strikes and demonstrations in May and
June,2003.210 Prime Minister Raffarin declared, "The street should express itself...
But the street doesn't govern, ' ' 2 1land Social Affairs Minister Franqois Fillon said,
"We will go to the end of this reform." 21 2 Indeed, Fillon advised a parliamentary
session, "There is no alternative to this reform. The government does not stop half
way., 213 "There will be neither a retreat, nor report nor a rewriting of the project. I
know what is happening in the streets, but like the vast majority
of French citizens, I
214
do not understand how they can strike against equity.,
This unassailable commitment to reform clearly appears to have played a
critical role in the ultimate success of the retirement reform. 21 5 In 2003, the French
government proposed three significant social reforms: (1) reform of the retirement
system, (2) decentralization of the education system, 2 16 and (3) reform of the health
care system. 217 Its credibility, however, only rested on one reform: reform of the
Thus, perhaps not surprisingly,21 9 the government put off
retirement system.
209. French Vow to Defend Gold-PlatedPensions,INDEP. ON SUNDAY (LONDON), Feb. 2,
2003, at 18; see also Yves Thrdard, Editorial, Raffarinface aux ractionnaires,LE FIGARO,
May 24-25, 2003, at 24, 24 (contending that the government's credibility depends on
instituting reform).
210. See Nicolas Domenach, Raffarin s'en va-t-en guerre,MARJANNE, May 19-25, 2003,
at 24, 24 (noting that the Prime Minister said that in order to govern for the duration, the right
needs to win a social battle and that he would go to the end); Hervd Algalarrondo, Quand la
"Franced6t c6t6" change la donne; Si Raffarin cede... ,LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, May 29June 4, 2003, at 44, 44 (noting that the government believed that the real risk was to cede to
the union federations, not to hold firm against them).
211. Crumley, supra note 140.
212. Fonctionnaires:la colhre est-ellejustif e?, LE FIGARO, May 24-25, 2003, at 1.
213. Kim Housego, Public Sector Strike Shuts Down France,MIAMI HERALD LEADER,
May 14, 2003, 2003 WL 20215831.
214. Olivier Nouaillas, Pendant le dibat,la crisecontinue, LA VIE, June 12, 2003, at 32.
215. Cf.Barroux & Bezat, supra note 151, at 8 (noting that Ernest-Antoine Seillirre,
president of the employer organization Medef, applauded the French government for having in the first time in decades - sufficient desire to reform to withstand all of the negative
reactions, "corpartists," extremists, and blockages).
216. See, e.g., Jacques Juillard, L'impossible metier, LE NOuvEL OBSERVATEUR, at 64
(discussing proposed reform of the education system).
217. See Vanessa Schneider, Raffarin perd le b~nefice du doute, LIBERATION, June 17,
2003, availableat http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=l 18274.
218. Cf Christine Monin, "Enfrance,on ne sait toujourspasn~gocier,"LA VIE, June 12,
2003, at 33, 34 (noting that Alain Touraine, a well-known French sociologist, thought that the
French government's credibility depended on reform of the retirement system not its other
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reform of the education system and health system 220 but held firm to reform of the
retirement system. Its unwavering commitment was rewarded on July 24, 2003, when
the National Assembly and the Senate voted in favor of the reform.

D. Summary
Although it is never possible to know exactly why one reform proposal
succeeds when another fails, three separate factors point to the success of the 2003
reform. First, the system was facing serious short-term and long-term funding
difficulties, and the public was well informed about the funding difficulties as well as
the possible means of reform. Second, the government initiated and developed the
reform through a very unique and public process of debate, consultation, and
negotiation. It intentionally and repeatedly consulted with the trade union
organizations and ultimately reached an accord with two trade union federations, CFT
and CFE-CGC, prior to introducing the reform before the parliament. Finally, Prime
Minister Raffarin was absolutely and incontrovertibly committed to reform. He was
willing to stake the credibility of his government on the reform and hold firm despite
public protests and demonstrations. 2

IV. THE STAGNANT AMERICAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
Like France, the United States has long debated reform of its Social Security
system. Unlike France, however, the United States has not instituted any significant
reform of the American Social Security system since 1983.
Because Congress does not typically negotiate with labor unions before
introducing or enacting legislation in the United States, only two of the three reasons
pointing to the success of the French reform in 2003 are of relevance in the United
States: (1) public education and (2) political commitment. This section analyzes these
two factors in the American context to help understand why the American Social
Security system has remained unchanged for so long.

proposed reforms).
219. In June 2003, Alain Touraine, a well-known French sociologist prognosticated that
the French government would abandon its other reform proposals in favor of reform of the
retirement system because its credibility depended on it. Id.
220. Cf. Frangois Dufay & ttienne Gemelle, Les Intennittencesde la reforme, LE POINT,
July 18, 2003, at 22, 22 (noting that the government was scheduled to consider reform of the
education system and retirement system upon return from the summer recess); See also
Gudlaud & Le Coeur, supranote 147, at 6 (noting that the French government elected to delay
reform of the French health care system).
221. Cf Les retraites, c'est vote, LIBERATION, July 25, 2003, at 2 (Frangois Fillon

described the reform as the fruit of dialogue, courage, and determination).
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A. Public Education
Like the French government, the American government has long studied the
American Social Security system and its financing difficulties. For example, each
year, the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds ("Social Security Trustees") issues an annual report
on Social Security's financial operations and projections regarding its future financial
2 22
status.
Similarly, the Congressional Budget Office 22 3 and the Government
Accountability Office 224 regularly study Social Security and its financial status.
Moreover, in 2001, President Bush established a bipartisan 16-member commission,
called the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security, to study and report
specific recommendations to reform Social Security. The Commission's report was
released on December 21, 2001. 225
Like the French reports, these American governmental reports do not sit on
dust. They too are widely reported in the popular press, 226 are
bookshelves
gathering
readily available
on the Internet, 227 and the American government recognizes the

222. For the most recent report, see 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2.
223. For a recent report, see CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE OUTLOOK FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
(2004), availableat http:/www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5530/06-14-SocialSecurity.pdf.
224. For a recent study by the General Accountability Office, whose name was changed
from the General Accounting Office effective July 7, 2004, see GAO, Social SECURITY
REFORM:

ANALYSIS OF A TRUST FUND EXHAUSTION

http://www.gao.gov/newitems/D03907.pdf
225. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN

SCENARIO

(2003), available at

SOC. SEC., STRENGTHENING SOCIAL

SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS

(2001).

For a critique of

this report see, for example, Colleen E. Medill, Challengingthe Four "Truths" of Personal
SocialSecurityAccounts: Evidence ofthe World of4Ol (k)Plans, 81 N.C. L. REv. 901 (2003).
226. See, e.g., Social Security Report a Hot Issue; Programin Better FinancialShape,
CBO Says; Democrats,GOPDebateNeedfor Major Overhaul,SEA. TIMES, June 15,2004, at
A7, 2004 WLNR 1793045 (discussing discrepancy between CBO and Social Security
Trustees' reports and President's Commission's report); Robert Pear, More upbeat view on
Social Security; System in less trouble than forecast, says CongressionalBudget Office,
OAKLAND TRIB., June 15, 2004, (discussing CBO and Social Security Trustees' reports); Saul
Friedman, Lies calculated to end Social Security, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 2004, at B04, 2004
WLNR 1098791 (discussing Social Security Trustees' report); Jane Bryant Quinn, Social
Security Isn'tDoomed, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2004, at 47.
227. For example, the Social Security Trustees' report is available on the Social Security
Administration's website, http://www.ssa.gov/; the Congressional Budget Office's reports are
available on their website, http://www.cbo.gov/; the Government Accountability Office's
reports are on their website, http://www.gao.gov/, and the President's Commission to
Strengthen Social Security's report is available on their website, http://www.csss.gov/.
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importance of educating the American public about their contents.228 There is,
however, one significant difference between the French reports and the American
reports. Prior to the 2003 reform, the French reports showed that the French
retirement system was facing serious short term financing difficulties as well as longrange problems. The American reports, in contrast, show that the American Social
Security system's short-term financial future is secure, although it faces a long-term
deficit.
Specifically, the Social Security Trustees' 2004 Annual Report predicts that
contributions to the American Social Security system will exceed benefits paid by the
system until 2018.229 Beginning in 2018, Social Security will need to draw down the
assets held in the Social Security Trust Fund in order to pay full benefits, and the
Trust Fund will be exhausted by 2042.230 At that point in time, under present tax
rates, contributions will only cover 73 percent of scheduled benefits in 2042 and 68
percent of scheduled benefits in 2078.231
The short-term nature of the French retirement system's funding difficulties
led to a widespread consensus that immediate reform was essential.232 In the United
States, in contrast, experts generally believe that Social Security's long-term financing
difficulties should be addressed soon rather than later,233 but immediate reform is not
228. See, e.g., Michael W. Wyand, Dialogueon SocialSecurity Reform to Continue This
Year, Committee StaffSays, 31 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 388, 388 (2004) (noting that

Kim Hildred, majority staff director to the House Ways & Means Subcommittee on Social
Security said, "it is hoped dialogue on reform will serve to educate the public. Congress
especially desires to engage young people on the issue.
229. 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.

230. Id.at 10. The Congressional Budget Office, in contrast, predicts that the Social
Security Trust Fund will not be exhausted until 2052. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note
223.
231. 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.

232. Indeed, even Marc Blondel, leader of Force Ouvi~re, the "famously combative leftist
union," conceded that there was a need for reform. Crumley, supra note 140. He simply

objected to the Fillon plan and contended that the pension deficit should have been solved by
increasing taxes, "above all on income and capital gains by businesses and the rich." Id. See
also Retraites, un mois pour convaincre, supra note 205, at 27 (noting that trade union
organizations suggested that the funding deficit be solved by increased taxes).

233. For example, the Social Security Advisory Board, an independent, 7-member
bipartisan Advisory Board created to advise the President, Congress, and Social Security
Commission on matters related to the Social Security and Supplement Income Programs has
said, "Prompt action is essential if we are to restore confidence in the future of Social Security
and enable today's workers to plan for a secure retirement." Soc. SEC. ADVISORY BD.,
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2002). See also ROBERT M. BALL, INSURING THE ESSENTIALS: BOB BALL
ON SOCIAL SECURITY 248 (Thomas N. Bethell ed., 2000) (contending that it is better to take
action sooner rather than later); Michael W. Wyand, Treasury's Snow Says Program
UnderfundedandUnsustainable,31 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 706, 706 (2004) (noting

that Treasury Secretary John Snow has said, "'[T]he sooner action is taken, the better for all
concerned.' Each year that passes without needed changes to the program makes the ultimate
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crucial. Prompt action is preferable because it offers a wider range of possible
changes.234 For example, because benefit cuts usually must be imposed very
gradually, benefit cuts are only an option if reform is slowly implemented over
time.235 If reform is delayed too long, options are limited and changes may be
dramatic.236 Nevertheless, there is not the same urgency for reform as there was in
France 237 because, unlike the French retirement system, the American Social Security
system is currently running a surplus. Indeed, for the next fourteen years, payroll
contributions are expected to exceed benefit payments.

B. Political Commitment
Unlike in France, until shortly before this article went to press, neither the
President of the United States nor the members of Congress have displayed the
political will necessary to amend Social Security. This lack of political will is
perhaps most aptly illustrated by the political games played prior to the November
2002 election.238 That year, Democrats, who generally oppose partial privatization of
resolution more difficult."); Warren Rojas, Improved Trust Fund Projections Reignite
PrivatizationDebate, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 27, 2002, at 59-3 available at LEXIS 2002

TNT 59-3 (quoting Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil: "The earlier action is taken to address this
prospect, the easier it will be to strengthen these essential programs for generations to come.").
But see Jane Bryant Quinn, supranote 226, at 47 ("A few rebels think that everyone is crying
wolf: Social Security may not need any fixes at all."); DEAN BAKER & MARK WEISBROT,
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE PHONY CRISIS (1999) (contending no reform is needed).
234. See, e.g., Social Security: Whose Trust Will Be Broken?, Hearing before the Spec.

Comm. on Aging, U S.Senate, 108 th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of David M. Walker,
Comptroller Gen., U.S. GEN. AcCT. OFF.) ("Acting sooner rather than later would clearly help

to ease the difficulty of change.... Waiting until Social Security faces an immediate solvency
crisis will limit the scope of feasible solutions and could reduce the option only to those
choices that are the most difficult and dramatic options.").
235. See HENRY J. AARON & ROBERT D. REISCHAUER, COUNTDOWN TO REFORM: THE
GREAT SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE 159 (1998)
236. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: ANALYSIS OF A TRUST FUND
EXHAUSTION SCENARIO ILLUSTRATES THE DIFFICULT CHOICES AND THE NEED FOR EARLY

ACTION 14 & Fig.7 (2003) (showing that if nothing is done until 2042, a benefit adjustment of
31 %or a tax adjustment of 46 %would be necessary compared to a benefit adjustment of 13
% and a tax adjustment of 15 % if changes were made in 2003).
237. See, e.g., Robert M. Ball, How to Fix Social Security? It Doesn'tHave to be Hard,
AGING
TODAY, Mar.-Apr.
2004, available at http://www.asaging.org/at/at252/How To Fix.cfm (contending that Social Security Trustees' forecasts are no cause for
panic and there is ample time to make adjustments).
238. Cf.Warren Rojas, supra note 233, at 59-3.
Health and Human Secretary Tommy G. Thompson charged House
Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt with attempting to stir up
controversy rather than presenting an alternate solution. "If he were
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Social Security, 2 39 sought to force Republicans to debate partial privatization of
Social Security on the House floor.24 ° Meanwhile, Republicans, who generally and
presumably genuinely believe that partial privatization is the remedy to Social
Security's woes, 24 1 sought to block floor debate on the privatization bills so they
would not be on record for having supported them.242
Specifically, on March 20, 2002, four Democrats 243 who opposed partial
truthfully wanting to do something, he'd sit down with Republicans and
have a bipartisan approach to solving the problem. But that's not the
intent .... It's pure partisan politics being played to try and find an issue
for the election."

Id.
239. For these purposes, partial privatization of Social Security refers to proposals that
provide that some, but not all, Social Security benefits are to be funded through pre-funded
individual accounts. Cf Patti Mohr, Shaw Seeks Daschle'sEndorsementfor PrivateAccounts,
TAx NOTES TODAY, Jan. 10, 2002, at 7-1 available at LEXIS 2002 TNT 7-1 (noting that
Democrats "generally resist a [Republican] plan to create [private] accounts" in Social
Security).
240. See Rep. Nancy Pelosi, PelosiRelease on Improving Widows'Benefits, TAx NOTES
TODAY, May 14, 2002, at 95-17 availableat LEXIS 2002 TNT 95-17 ("Democrats have asked
repeatedly for the opportunity to debate the Republican privatization plan."); Sen. Tom
Daschle & Rep. Richard A. Gephardt, Gephardt,DaschleLetter on Risks of Social Security
Privatization,TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 25, 2002, at 37-64 availableat LEXIS 2002 TNT 3764 ("[W]e believe the American people want and deserve a national dialogue about any plans
to privatize Social Security.... Again, we urge that the House schedule a full debate on H.R.
3135 including the opportunity for amendment by both parties on Republican efforts to
privatize Social Security.").
241. Still believing in the creation of individual accounts but finding the term
"privatization" to be a political liability, Republicans began to distance themselves from the
term in 2002. They nevertheless remained true to the notion of creating individual accounts as
the solution to Social Security's financing difficulties. See, e.g., Rep. E. Clay Shaw, Jr., Shaw
Praise,Criticism of Daschle's Social Security Stance, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 16, 2002, at
136-23 availableat LEXIS 2002 TNT 163-23 (contending that "no Republican plan that has
been offered 'privatizes' Social Security. In fact, my plan leaves Social Security totally intact.
It also adds the opportunity for workers to choose ownership and control of a personal account
while guaranteeing current law benefits regardless of the account's investment performance.").
See also Rep. Richard A. Gephardt, GephardtStatement Urging Colleagues to Sign Petition
to Open Debateon SocialSecurity Privatization,TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 9, 2002, at 196-42
availableat LEXIS 2002 TNT 196-42 (declaring that "one Republican pollster presentation
advised his clients, don't use the word 'privatize' when you talk about Social Security on the
campaign trail. Get a new word, he said: maybe personalize, maybe traumatize. I don't know
what the right word is, but it sure isn't privatization.").
242. See Warren Rojas, House Rejects PermanentEducation Tax Cuts, Senate Pension
Bill Gains Steam, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 5, 2002, at 172-1 availableat LEXIS 2002 TNT
172-1 (noting that "[b]oth the White House and House GOP leaders have put off their
modernization agenda until 2003").
243. The four sponsors were Robert Matsui, Richard Gephardt, Nancy Pelosi, and Charles

Reforming Retirement Systems

privatization of Social Security in general, and the recommendations of President
Bush's Commission to Strengthen Social Security in particular, introduced three
House bills encapsulating each of the Commission's three recommendations to
partially privatize Social Security. 244 Then, on May 21, 2002, Democratic
Representative Karen L. Thurman, introduced a House Resolution 245 resolving 246
to
begin immediate debate on these three bills as well as two Republican bills
providing for partial privatization of Social Security.247 These Democrats did not
support the substance of the privatization bills, but simply sought a public debate on
privatization. 248 Meanwhile, Republicans, who presumably supported the substance
of the bills, did not co-sponsor the bills or push for committee consideration or floor
debate. Instead, they left them to die on the Committee floor. 249 Seeking to force
Rangel.
244. H.R. 4022, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacting Reform Model 1 as set forth in the
President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security); H.R. 4023, 107th Cong. (2002)
(enacting Reform Model 2 as set forth in the President's Commission to Strengthen Social
Security); H.R. 4024, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacting Reform Model 3 as set forth in the
President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security).
245. H. Res. 425, 107th Cong. (2002).
246. H.R. 3535, 107 th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3497, 107 th Cong. (2001).
247. Technically, the resolution required consideration of one of the Republic House
bills, H.R. 3497, and limited amendments to those of the other Republican bill, the three
Democratic bills encapsulating the President's Commission's recommendations, and a
Democratic bill, H.R. 4780, which rejects partial privatization of Social Security. See H. Res.
425, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002). Had the resolution required the consideration of more than
one bill, a discharge petition could not have been filed on that resolution. See RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES XV(2)(b)(2)
(109 t h Cong. 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/rules/houserules.htm ("A Member may not file a motion to discharge
the Committee on Rules from consideration of a resolution providing for the consideration of
more than one public bill or public resolution or admitting or effecting a nongermane
amendment to a public bill or public resolution.")
248. See The Missing Debate, 148 CONG. REc. H7174, H7175 (Oct. 8,2002) (statement
of Rep. Richard A. Gephardt, House Minority Leader).
Since Republicans have failed to put Social Security on the floor, we have
mounted a discharge petition to bring up the three plans from the
President's commission, all for privatization, so we can have a full and
free debate in the highest tradition of democratic governance. In this
discharge, we include a resolution of disapproval. This is more than a
debate. It is a way for the House to vote up or down on the Republican
plan, as well as the congressional plan of the Republicans to privatize
Social Security.
Id.; See also Rep. Robert T. Matsui, MatsuiRelease on Democrats'PushPrivatizationDebate,
TAX NOTES TODAY, May 22, 2002, at 100-64 available at LEXIS 2002 TNT 100-64 (noting
that "Republican leaders can move these bills at any time. If they do not, after the rule 'ripens'
for seven days, Democrats will launch a discharge petition to force the bills to the floor.").
249. Rep. Robert T. Matsui, Matsui Release on Social Security Debate, TAx NOTES
TODAY, Mar. 14, 2002, at 50-58 available at LEXIS 2002 TNT 50-58 ("Republicans have
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debate, though clearly not passage of the partial privatization bills, Representative
Thurman then filed a discharge petition on the House Resolution on June 19, 2002.25°
Despite sustained efforts, 5 the Democrats never managed to garner sufficient
support for the discharge petition, 252 and no bill on partial privatization reached the
House floor prior to the 2002 election.
This lack of political will is hardly surprising. Social Security is often
described as the third rail of politics: touch it and you die. 253 Indeed, the last time
Congress substantially amended Social Security (1983), it faced an imminent funding
crisis. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, high inflation combined with high
introduced various privatization bills, but refuse to mark them up in Committee or bring them
for a vote.").
250. See Petition 7, 148 Cong. Rec. H3826 (June 21, 2002). Cf 148 Cong. Rec. H667
(Mar. 5, 2002) (statement of House Minority Leader, Richard A. Gephardt).
I want a debate on this issue [privatization of Social Security] before the
election, not after the election. If Republicans fail to put Social Security
on the floor, I intend to mount a discharge petition to bring up the
Presidential commission's plans so that we can have a full and free
debate, the House of Representatives at its best.
Id.
251. See, e.g., The Missing Debate, supra note 248 (statement of rep. Richard A.
Gephardt, House Minority Leader) ("I urge my colleagues, sign this petition. Let us have a
meaningful Social Security discussion before we go to our districts for the fall election.").
252. See also Rojas, supra note 242, at 172 ("House Democrats have been attempting to
embarrass Republican leaders all year by pressing for a Social Security floor debate, but have
failed to gamer the support needed to move the issue into the legislative spotlight.").
Under House Rule XV(c), a discharge petition can remove any bill from committee after the
bill has been in committee for 30 days, if the discharge petition is signed by a majority of the
members of the House. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES XV(c) (109th Cong.
2005), availableat http://www.house.gov/rulesfhouserules.htm. The fact that the discharge
petition failed is not surprising. "Of the 371 discharge petitions initiated between 1937 and
1982, only 19 were successful." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 12 (1995). For
additional discussions of how rarely discharge petitions are successful, see John C. Roberts,
Are CongressionalCommittees Constitutional?:Radical Textualism, Separationof Powers,
and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. R. 489, 571 n.229 (2001), and authorities
cited therein.
253. See, e.g., Rojas, supranote 233, at 59-3 (noting that many refer to Social Security as
the "politically dangerous 'third rail"'); John Harrison, The Fiscal Powers and the 1930s:
Entrenchment, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295, 308 (1999) (stating that "Social Security is the
third rail of American politics: Touch it and you die."); Dallas L. Salisbury, Social Security Retirees Can'tLive Without It, It Can't Survive Without Reform, BEN. Q., June 22, 1997, at 8
(stating that "Social Security has come to be known as the 'third rail' of politics" because it is
the dominant source of income for the retired population); But see AARON & REISCHAUER,
supra note 235, at 189 ("If references to Social Security as the third rail of American politics
were once valid, someone has turned off the electricity. Politicians who once said, "Touch it
and you die" now seem eager to propose far-reaching changes to the system.").
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unemployment had resulted in soaring benefit payments as payroll tax revenues
dwindled.254 Indeed, benefit payments had exceeded contributions since 1975, and it
was anticipated that, without legislative action, it would no longer be possible for the
Social Security program to pay benefits on time beginning in July 1983.255 ,An
estimated $150-200 billion in increased revenues or reduced expenditures was needed
the Social Security
to restore financial viability through the 1980's. '' 256 In addition,
257
actuaries projected a long-range deficit for the program.
Faced with this impending crisis, on December 16, 1981, President Reagan
created a bipartisan commission, the National Commission on Social Security
Reform, to study the short and long-term financial conditions of Social Security and
report findings and recommendations to the President and Congress. 258 The
Commission reported its findings and recommendations to the President and Congress
on January 20, 1983,259 and, three months later, President Reagan signed into law, the
Social Security Amendments Act of 1983,260 which substantially embodied the
Commission's recommendations. 26' President Reagan praised the law "as a tribute to
bipartisan action and 'a monument to the spirit of the compassion and commitment
that unites us as a people .... Each of us had to compromise one way or another.
262
But the essence of bipartisanship is to give up a little in order to get a lot.'
The 1983 Act contained 25 different provisions affecting Social Security's
financing. 263 Some of the provisions, such as delaying the July 1983 cost-of-living
adjustment (COLA) to January 1984 and shifting future COLAs to a calendar year
basis (payable in January, rather than July, of each year) 264 were designed to resolve
the program's short-term funding crisis. Other provisions, such as a delayed, gradual
increase in normal retirement age which only began to go into effect in 2000,265 were
intended to address the system's long-term financing difficulties.
The 1983 Act shows that American politicians can come together and make
difficult decisions and tradeoffs to address long-range financial difficulties in the
254. Robert M. Ball, Just a Little Maintenance, We Can Fix Social Security, If We Can
Manage the Politics, WASH. POST, July 18, 2004, at B04.
255. John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative
History andSummary of Provisions,SOC. SEC. BULL., July 1983, at 3, 3.
256. Id. at 3.
257. Id.

258. See Exec. Order No. 12,335, 46 Fed. Reg. 61,633 (Dec. 18, 1981)
259. See GREENSPAN COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM. ON SOC. SEC. REFORM
(1983).
260. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
261. Svahn & Ross, supra note 255, at 4-5 (describing the provisions of the law as

enacted and how they differed from the Commission's recommendations).
262. See id. at 3 (quoting President Reagan).
263. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21 §§ 101-201 (1983).
264. See id. § 111.
265. See id. § 201 (gradually increasing the normal retirement age from age 65 to age 67
beginning in 2000).
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Social Security program. The fact, however, that it was enacted in the midst of a
short-term funding crisis suggests the politicians are much more likely to come
together to enact such reform when there is an imminent funding crisis than when the
only difficulties are more long-term in nature.
Over the last decade, politicians ranging from Presidents 266 to Senators 267 to
Members of the House of Representatives 268 have called for reform of Social
Security. Until shortly before this article went to press, no politician in recent years
had displayed the political commitment necessary to reform the system.269

266. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union, (Jan. 21, 2004) available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/sou ("Younger
workers should have the opportunity to build a nest egg by saving part of their Social Security
taxes in a personal retirement account. We should make the Social Security system a source of
ownership for the American people. And we should limit the burden of government on this
economy by acting as good stewards of taxpayers' dollars."); President William J. Clinton,
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, PUBLIC PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS I WILLIAM J. CLINTON 2000-2001 129, 130- 31 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/congress/sou/sou00.pdf ("Beyond paying off the debt, we must ensure
that the benefits of debt reduction go to preserving two of the most important guarantees we
make to every American, Social Security and Medicare. Tonight I ask you to work with me to
make a bipartisan down payment on Social Security reform by crediting the interest savings
from debt reduction to the Social Security Trust Fund so that it will be strong and sound for the
next 50 years.").
267. Over the last decade, Senators have introduced a multitude of bills that would reform
Social Security. See, e.g., Social Security Solvency and Modernization Act of 2003, S. 1878,
108 th Cong. (2003); Social Security Protection Act of 2003, S. 439, 108 th Cong. (2003); Social
Security Preservation Act, S. 5, 107 th Cong. (2002).
268. Just as Senators have introduced a multitude of bills over the last decade that would
reform Social Security, so too have Members of Congress. See, e.g., Individual Social Security
Investment Program Act of 2004, H.R. 4895, 108th Cong. (2004); Social Security Personal
Savings Guarantee and Prosperity Act of 2004, H.R. 4851, 108th Cong. (2004); Bipartisan

Retirement Security Act of 2004, HR 3821, 108th Cong. (2004); Social Security Savings Act
of 2003, H.R. 3177, 108th Cong. (2003); Social Security Solvency Act of 2003, H.R. 3055,

108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 5734, 107th Cong. (2002); Rejecting Social Security Privatization
Act of 2002, H.R. 5541, 107th Cong. (2002).
269. See William Neikirk, Recorddeficit begins to curbBush agenda, CmI. TRIB., Jan. 22,
2004, at 1, availableat 2004 WLNR 17852526 (noting that over the last three years Bush has
not pushed his partial privatization plan). Cf. David Hess, Social Security PrivatizationBill
Introduced,Action Unlikely, CONG. DAILY, Jan. 21, 2004, availableat 2004 WLNR 17661301
(noting that bipartisan group of Representatives saw little likelihood of Congress enacting
Social Security reform any time soon. President Bush "must raise the issue during a campaign
and win on it to convince Congress to act. [Senate Finance Chairman Grassley stated,] 'There
has to be a mandate."'). Cf Sen. Don Nickles, RetiringAmerica: Why the UnitedStates Needs
a New Kind of Social Securityfor the New Millennium, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 77, 108 (1999)
("[L]awmakers fear modifying [Social Security], reforming it, or even talking about it because
of the political risks they associate with such action").

Reforming Retirement Systems

V. CONCLUSION
In 2003, the French retirement system faced serious short and long-term
funding difficulties. After years of debate and inaction, the government finally
enacted a sweeping reform of the French retirement system in the summer of 2003.
This reform is expected to remedy much, though likely not all, of the financing
difficulties the retirement system faced. The reform's success appears to be
attributable to three significant factors. First, the French retirement system faced very
serious short and long-term financing difficulties, and the French public was well
informed of these difficulties. Second, the French actively and intentionally
negotiated with the French trade union federations in the reform process, a process it
described as one of "information, dialogue, and consultation." Finally, Prime
Minister Raffarin was firmly and irrevocably committed to reforming the French
retirement system and was willing to weather months of public strikes and
demonstrations to reach his ultimate goal of reform.
Like France, the American Social Security system faces serious funding
difficulties and the American government has long debated reform of its Social
Security system. Unlike France, however, the United States has not enacted a major
reform of the Social Security system since 1983. Two differences between the United
States and France help explain this difference. First, although the American public is
well aware of Social Security's financing difficulties, the system's difficulties are
long-term in nature rather than short-term like in France. Second, no American
politician has yet demonstrated the same level of commitment to reform as Prime
Minister Raffarin did in 2003.
In the absence of an immediate funding crisis 2 7 or an unwavering
commitment to reform,271reform of the American Social Security system is likely to
be a long time in coming,272 especially in these days of federal budget deficits. The
270. Two Democratic Representatives confirmed this view in a meeting before the
Internal Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans on May 18, 2004. See Michael Wyand,
Congress Will Only Address Reform When It Becomes a Crisis, Lawmakers Say, 31 BNA
& BENEFITS REP. 1127, 1127 (2004) (noting that Rep. Rahm Emanuel said "Congress

PENSION

will only address Social Security reform when it becomes a crisis" and Rep. Charles W.
Stenholm "agree[s] with Rahm very strongly, until we see the 'whites of their eyes' or until we
are absolutely there [a Social Security crisis', you are just not going to see this Congress, this
administration, or any Congress or any administration deal with this because it is politically
difficult."').
271. Cf Ball, supra note 254, at B04 (declaring that "I know that repairing Social
Security is well within our grasp - all we need is the political will").
272. See also Michael W. Wyand, Groups Offer Reform ProposalsDespite Very Little
LikelihoodofEnactment, 31 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 336, 336 (2004) (noting that "[a]t

a news conference on Jan. 21 following the President's Jan. 20 address, Reps. Jim Kolbe (RAriz.) and Charles W. Stenholm (D-Texas), among others, acknowledged that in all likelihood,
2004 will be limited to debate on reform, but no final legislation").
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late 1990s and early 2000s offered the American government a unique opportunity 274
to
2 73
reform Social Security because the federal government was running a surplus.
That opportunity, however, was squandered and the federal government is once again
running a deficit. 275 Despite the incontrovertible need to address Social Security's
long-term funding deficit, reform does not appear to be just around the comer.

273. See AARON & REISCHAUER, supranote 235, at 158 ("America has a rare opportunity
to restore financial balance to the nation's mandatory retirement system and modernize it for
the twenty-first century. The economy is strong. Inflation is well controlled. The federal
budget is in surplus for the first time in three decades. Demographic pressures are low....
These favorable circumstances will not last.").

274. See

CONG. U. S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:

FIscAL YEARS 2005 TO 2014, at 129 (2004) (showing that the federal government ran a budget
surplus from 1998 through 2001 and returned to a deficit in 2002).
275. As of August 5, 2004, the Congressional Budget Office projected a budget deficit of
$422 billion for the fiscal year 2004. CONG. BUDGET OFF., MONTHLY BUDGET REVIEW, at 1, 1
(2004), availableat http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5721/08-2004-MBR.pdf (last visited
Apr. 18, 2005).

